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DANDIN'S KĀVYĀDARŚA

PARICHCHHEDA II

EDITED WITH A NEW

SANSKRIT COMMENTARY AND ENGLISH NOTES

BY

S K BELVALEKAR, M. A., Ph. D.,
PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT,
Deccan College, Poona

RANGACHARYA B. RADDI,
SHASTRI, VIDYARHITHANA,
Karnatak College, Dharwar.

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PARICHCRHEDA II

Notes to II. 1—(i) Compare Note (i) to I. 10. Kāvya, according to Dandin, is—*शब्दप्रधानं यथावली*; that is to say, he gives more prominence to the word element in poetry as compared with the sense-element. This does not mean that the Gunas which are the *sine qua non* of poetry, and the Alamkāras which serve as decoration, must belong to the word-element, the *शब्द*, exclusively; for, the *विशेष्य*, the subordinate elements of the Body, have also their own decorations. Thus there is no inconsistency in Dandin's having defined Kāvya as he has done and then having divided the Alamkāras (and impliedly the Gunas also—cp Note (i) to I. 41) into those belonging to word and those belonging to sense. Modern Alamkārikas such as Mammata, having once subordinated both the word as well as the sense to Rasa, are constrained to regard the Gunas as well as the Alamkāras as belonging to Rasa, the *adiga*. For a criticism of this view see our Note (iii) to I. 41 and the Sanskrit Commentary to the present *śloka*.

(ii) The distinct function of the Gunas and the Alamkāras is brought out by Dandin by calling the former the life-breaths and the latter the ornaments of poetry. The Gunas abide in poetry *समवस्यन्त्या* while the Alamkāras *विशेष्यन्त्या*; there is between them a distinction in kind,—a distinction which later became one of degree, as with *वामन* (iii 1 1-2) or with *प्रतिपद* (p 17)—*गुणः सत्यं वाच्यते विशेषो यत्* । *रसः तु सुन्दरप्रतिपदो वाच्यः* । *रसोपनिषदेषु विशेषः* । Compare however the following from *अनेकार्थः* p 20—

अनेकप्रकारेण यत् न वाच्यं सुन्दरं च ।
सुन्दरं वाच्यं सुन्दरे सुन्दरवाच्यं च ।
अनेकार्थस्यैवैव सुन्दरे रसः च विदुः
विदुः चैव वाच्यं रसं रसविदुः च ।

Compare also (Aguṇipūraṇa 346 1)—

अनेकप्रकारेण यत् न वाच्यं सुन्दरं च ।
सुन्दरं वाच्यं सुन्दरे सुन्दरवाच्यं च ।

Mammata's *अनेकप्रकारेण* is the same thing

उपेक्षा, अतिशयोक्ति, —based on अव्यवहारः

विभावना, विशेषोक्ति, [विपन्न, चित्र, अगमति, अन्योन्य, व्यापात, अतद्गुण,]

भारिक, [विशेष,] —based on विशेषः

यथार्थन्याय, [परिमलन्याय, अर्थोपनि, विकल्प, समुच्चय,] —based on वाक्यन्यायः

परिपुष्टि, [प्रत्यनीक, तद्गुण,] गम्यति (= गमाहित), [राग,] स्वभावोक्ति, उदात्त, [विशेषोक्ति,] —based on लोकव्यवहारः

[वाक्यलिङ्ग, अनुमान,] अर्थान्तरन्याय, —based on तर्कन्यायः

[कारणमाला, एकावली, मालादीपक, मार,] —based on शृङ्खललविविध्यः

[व्याजोक्ति, वक्षोक्ति, मौलन,] —based on अग्रहवः and

गमागोक्ति, [परिहर,] —based on विशेषणविविध्यः.

It became soon obvious that any such classificatory principle or principles, would gradually tend to become *inadequate*, as there would always remain some *Alamkāras* recognised by rhetoricians and falling outside their scope. Thus of the 35 or rather 31 *Alamkāras* recognised by Dandin the following 14 are not included in the above list. —आपुष्टि, आक्षेप, हेतु, गुण्य, येषां, प्रेषम्, रम्यत्वं, ऊर्ध्वस्वित्, पर्यायोक्त, शिष्ट, विशेष, अप्रस्तुतप्रसंगा, व्याजस्तुति, and आशी. (not to mention गरीर्ण) Some of these, e.g., प्रेषम्, रम्यत्वं, ऊर्ध्वस्वित्, are sometimes classed as गम्यलङ्कारः; while आक्षेप, पर्यायोक्त, अप्रस्तुतप्रसंगा, व्याजस्तुति and आशी: will have to be classed as नाट्यलङ्कारा, i.e., merely as effective modes of expression, such as those enumerated by Bharata in the beginning of the 16th chapter of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. The tendency towards a wanton increase merely in the number of the *Alamkāras* (and of subdivisions within an *Alamkāra*), which marked the latest phase in the history of the *Alamkārasāstra*, made any attempt to trace the *Alamkāras* to their धीत्र—such as Dandin contemplates—an altogether hopeless task.

(ii) But already in some quarters, as in the case of the *Gunas*,—see note (ii) to 141—a revolt against this gratuitous multiplication of entities had begun to assert itself. Thus Hemachandra rejects परिहर, दशमहय, विशेषोक्ति, भारिक, उदात्त, रम्यत्वं, प्रेषम्, ऊर्ध्वस्वित्, भाव, गमाहित, आशी, and प्रत्यनीक, as distinct *Alamkāras*—and some of them, it will be seen, are recognised even by Dandin as *Bhāmaha Udbhata's Kāvyaśāstram*

Notes

Notes to II. 4—(i) We are not quite certain as to the genuineness of this list of Alamkāras (stanzas 4-7), although all the Mas give it. It is the practice of some of the later Alamkāras to preface their treatment of the Alamkāras by a few mnemonic verses of their own composition, but some writers, e.g. Mammata, have not obliged their would-be students in this manner, and just as in the case of Mammata a commentator has added a versified enumeration at the beginning of the tenth Ullāsa (although never as a part of Mammata's own work), so, it seems to us, must have been the case with Dandin. It is only on some such supposition that we can account for the ungrammatical दृष्टव्यं (or the unmetrical दृष्टव्यं); and also for the further fact that in this enumeration some figures (e.g. *सं शब्दप्रयोगः*) appear under strange, and others (e.g. *विशेषः* for *विशेषः*) under misleading names. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that Achārya Dandin could not have avoided such solecisms and ambiguities if he had meant it.

(ii) Vibhavana is often rendered as Presumption, but that is a name that we must reserve for *संशयः*, which *अपेक्षा* and others recognise as a distinct figure-of-speech, or a Peculiar Causation. It is rather an imagination or a guessing or a divining of a novel cause to set out for the effect that has already taken place. Possibly a motivated effect will explain the idea of the figure and would serve to distinguish it from a co-operative cause by which term we could render the figure *संशयः* as it is ordinarily defined. Dandin's account of the figure is however a little bit different. See below.

(iii) The latter half of this stanza is identical with stanza II. 16 first half.

Notes to II. 5 (i) The second half of this stanza is identical with stanza II. 16 first half. We have already commented upon the name *सा* as later a *संशयः* is a distinction between the figure *संशयः*

समाधि (which is the same as Dandin's समाहित) and the figure समाहित which is a रम्यल Alamkāra Compare Ruyyaka, pp 163, 185; Visvanātha, pp. 568, 576; Visveśvara in the Alamkāraakustubha, pp. 372, 416. Bhoja gives the two figures, but what he calls समाधि approaches the समाधिगुण (cp. note (ii) to i. 93-92), while he does not at all recognise the रम्यलक Alamkāra called समाहित in other texts. Bhoja, however, agrees with Dandin in calling by the name समाहित the figure named समाधि by मम्मट and others.

Notes to II. 6—(i) We have already commented upon the use of the abbreviated name विशेष for विशेषोक्ति. Viśeṣha as a figure distinct from विशेषोक्ति is recognised, amongst others, by Rudrata, Ruyyaka, Mammata, Visvanātha, and Jagannātha.

Notes to II. 7—(i) The figure आशीः recognised by Dandin is recognised by no other Ālamkārika except Bhāmaha and Vāgbhata the author of the Kāvyaanusāsana. It should be noted, however, that the name occurs amongst the 36 effective literary devices mentioned by Bharata in the beginning of the 16th Chapter. Bhavika usually translated by 'Vision' will have to be rendered, consistently with Dandin's explanation of the term, by some such expression as Sustained-Intuition

Notes to II. 8—(i) Besides the two names for this figure given by Dandin the figure is also called स्वभाव (अलंकारोत्तर, p 35) and स्वभाव (अभिप्राय 344. 3); while छट groups this figure along with a number of others under the head of वास्तव figures, i e., those that have the portrayal of the thing-as-it-is as their object. Compare (viii 10-12)~

वास्तवमिति नाम्नेयं क्रियते वास्तव्यव्यवधानं यत् ।

पुनर्यमवाक्येन निरूपयन्तीत्यममयेयम् ॥

sarily requires that the objects be two in reality ; and it is this implication that has been expressly brought out by qualifications such as मिथो विभिन्नदत्ताकारदिसादयोः, द्वयोः, भेदे or भिन्नयोः । The word उद्भूतम् is represented in other definitions by वेनेद्वादि, घमन्वादि, इदम् or सन्दम्. The specific mention of the technical terms उपमान and उपमेय in the definitions and the substitution of the word साधर्म्यम् (गमानो घनो यदोभौ साधर्माभौ तयोर्भावः) for the simpler सादृश्य, as also some late qualifications like, एकवाक्यदवाक्य (उपमेयोपमायां वाक्यद्वयम् तदनिव्याप्तिवार्णाय), उपमानोपमेयस्योभययोः, etc. serve to exclude from the sphere of उपमा such varieties as अन्योन्योपमा, अद्भुतोपमा, मोदोपमा, संज्ञोपमा, निर्णयोपमा, प्रतिषेधोपमा, अगाधारणोपमा, प्रतिबन्धोपमा, and तुल्योपमा which Dandin embraces under the general term उपमा but which later Ālambikārikas raised to the dignity of independent figures. Dandin's conception of उपमा, and of सादृश्य which is its basis, is thus very wide and general.

(iii) We have already given above (Note (i) to ii 2) Vidyānātha's list of figures based on similarly, and the extracts in our Commentary (P. 129) sufficiently illustrate this point. The fundamental importance of the relation of sameness was indeed very early perceived. The Agnipurāṇa for instance divides सार्वदम् (defined as धर्मगमनम्) into उपमा, रूपक, गृहाण and अध्वन्यन्याम and शब्द similarly defines औपम्यम् as (VIII. 1)—

सार्वदं प्रत्यक्षद्विगुं स्वकदं वाच्यं तत्तद्व्यभिचारे ।

अध्वन्यन्यामभ्याप्यद्विगुं तद्विभक्तौऽप्युपमम् ॥

and enumerates the following figures as based upon that relation—

उपमानोऽप्युपमेयस्य सार्वदं सार्वदं समानोक्तिः ।

समान्यन्यामभ्यासः प्रत्यक्षद्विगुः सार्वदं सार्वदं ॥

उपमेयस्य सार्वदं सार्वदं सार्वदं सार्वदं ॥

पुनरावृत्तिरप्युपमेयस्य सार्वदं सार्वदं सार्वदं ॥

The justification for the enumeration of these (and others) as distinct figures (and not mere varieties of उपमा) should consist in the clear statement that the सार्वद-द्वयवैषम्य in these figures is subordinated to some other वैषम्य (of identity, doubt, error, contrast, etc.) Dandin at least, as we will presently see brought in this

early requires that the objects be two in reality ; and it is this implication that has been expressly brought out by qualifications such as मिथो विभिन्नोद्देशकार्त्वादिगन्धयोः द्वयोः, भेदे or भिन्नयोः । The word उद्भूतम् is represented in other definitions by वेनेहासि, चमस्कारि, हृद्यम् or सुन्दरम्. The specific mention of the technical terms उपमान and उपमेय in the definitions and the substitution of the word साधर्म्यम् (समानो धर्मो यदोक्तो सधर्माणो तयोर्भावे) for the simpler गान्धय, as also some late qualifications like, एववावदवाच्य (उपमेयोरपमायां वाच्यद्वयम् तदतिशयोक्तिवर्णनाय), उपमानोपमेयव्ययोग्ययोः, etc serve to exclude from the sphere of उपमा such varieties as शून्योपमेयमा, अद्रुतोपमा, मोहोपमा, संज्ञोपमा, निर्णयोपमा, प्रतिशेधोपमा, असाधारणोपमा, प्रतिगन्तुपमा, and मुख्ययोगोपमा which Dandin embraces under the general term उपमा but which later Alamkarikas raised to the dignity of independent figures. Dandin's conception of उपमा, and of गान्धय which is its basis, is thus very wide and general.

(iii) We have already given above (Note (i) to II 2) Vidyānātha's list of figures based on similarly, and the extracts in our Commentary (P. 129) sufficiently illustrate this point. The fundamental importance of the relation of resemblance was indeed very early perceived. The *Agnipurāṇa* for instance divides *सप्तम्यम्* (defined as *धमेगमाद्वयम्*) into *इयमा*, *इयव*, *सप्तसि* and *अथ-नवम्यम्* and *एतद्* similarly defines *औषम्यम्* as (viii 1)—

॥ १ ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥

॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥

and enumerates the following figures as based upon that relation—

સુખમંત્રેણાદયક કાવ્યદત્તિ સદાદ્ય સમસંસ્કૃતિ ।

[illegible]

उत्तराखण्ड के अर्थव्यवस्था में पर्यटन का योगदान

एकमाहोत्सवसमाप्त्यनन्तरमन्त्रालय'तः प्रत्येकदिने

The justification for the elimination of these (and others) as distinct types (and not mere varieties of them) should consist in the circumstance that the *sva* *śabd* in these figures is subordinated to some *sva* *śabd* of identity (don't error contrast etc.) b) at least, as we will presently see brought

यदुक्तं विप्रसारत्वं तस्या वैशिष्ट्यमात्मभिः ।
निन्दाप्रशंसाचिन्त्यामाभेदादत्राभिधीयते ॥
सामान्यगुणनिर्देशान् प्रथममुक्तिं ननु ।
मालोपमादिः सर्वोपि न ज्यायान् विभक्तौ मुधा ॥

It has to be noted however that the Agnipurāṇa gives a classification of the उपमा's analogous to that of Dandin [viz.—धर्म, वस्तु, पदम्पर, विपरीत, नियम, अनियम, समुच्चय, व्यतिरेक, बहु, माला, विक्रिया, अद्भुत, मोह, संग्रह, निश्चय, वाक्यार्थ, समन (रसता ?), प्रशंसा, निन्दा, कल्पिता, सदृशी, and अमदृशी], besides giving another classification into 18 sub-varieties similar to those of Mammata (344. 7-9)—

गमाभेदाभेदाभेदा मा द्विधा प्रतियोगिनः ॥
विप्रहादाभिधानस्य समसामान्यथोत्तराः ।
उपमा द्योतकदेनोपमेयपदेन च ॥
ताभ्यां च विप्रहादं त्रेधा समसामान्तिमा विधा ।
विशिष्यमाणा उपमा भवन्त्यष्टादश स्फुटाः ॥

The varieties called निन्दा and प्रशंसा are even mentioned and illustrated by Bharata himself (xvi. 48 ff.), though neither Bharata nor the Agnipurāṇa mentions the अचिन्त्यासोपमा, the main butt of attack. The author of the Alamkāraśekhara gives the following ten sub-varieties of उपमा (xi. 3)—

वाक्यार्थोक्तिगयभेदनिन्दाभूतविषयया ।
सदृशो नियम इव च विविच्यलुपमा दश ॥

But no other writer whose work is extant divides उपमा in the manner adopted by Dandin. Dandin's classification is primitive and, so far as any principle underlies the division, it is just the sense intended by the speaker (अर्थानुरोधेन विभागः)

(viii) We can here advantageously consider some other classifications of उपमा that have been advanced. There is one in particular which might be styled grammatical classification (व्याकरणप्रयोगानुरोधेन) which has been adopted by 332 (p. 16), 332 (viii. 3 ff.) मम्मट and most other later writers. But it seems to be not unknown to the author of the Agnipurāṇa (cp. 344. 8-9) who gives, as just mentioned, 18 varieties based on this principle as against Mammata's 2. These last we will now exhibit in a tabular form—

Later writers have introduced further subtle complexities in this classification which is in the first place made to contain 7 more varieties, 3 under पूर्णा and 4 under लुप्ता and in the next place there is introduced a further principle of five-fold sub-classification: इये कै-
भेदोपमा वस्त्वलंकाररसरूपाणां प्रधानव्यङ्ग्यानां वस्त्वलंकारयोर्वाच्ययोश्चोपस्कार-
तया पञ्चधा । इत्यन्येऽपि प्रभेदाः कुशाग्रीयधिपणेः स्वयमुद्भावनीयाः । तत्र
कचिदनुगाम्येव धर्मः । कचिच्च केवलं विषयप्रतिविम्बभावमापन्नः । कचिदुभयम् ।
कचिद्वस्तुप्रतिविस्तुभावेन करमिव तं विषयप्रतिविम्बभावम् । कचिदमन्तयुक्चरितः ।
कचिच्च केवलमव्यात्मकः । एभिर्भेदैः प्रागुक्तानां सधर्माणां भेदानां यथासमं गुणे
बहुतरा भेदा भवन्ति (रसगद्गाधर, p. 172 ff.).

(ix) Another principle of division is suggested by Bharata (xvi. 43)—

एकस्यैकेन सा कार्या एकस्य बहुमित्यया ।

अनेकेषां तथैकेन बहूनां बहुमित्यया ॥

For illustrations see अलंकारसौत्तुम p. 141 f. The varieties known as मालोपमा and रसनोपमा are sub-varieties under the second division of Bharata. Upamā, like Rūpaka, can also be divided as follows:—उपमा द्विविधा निखयया सावयया च । निखयया द्विधा शुद्धा मालारूपा च । सावययापि द्विधा समस्तवस्तु-
विषया एकदेशविचरिणी च । For details see Bhoja (iv. 20 ff.)

(x) Our Sanskrit Commentary on p. 129 quotes a passage from Chitramīmāṃsā illustrating how an example like चन्द्र इव सुरजम्, by a slight phrasing, can be turned into a number of other Alamkāras. As an Alamkāra Upamā is to be kept distinct from रूपक where the सादृश्य (usually defined as तद्विषये सति तद्वत्तुभूयो-
धर्मवत्त्व) is निगोभूत, and from उपेक्षा wherein, in spite of the occasional presence of words like इव, the matter of the similarity is not लोकरप्रगट् but purely a creation of the poet's imagination. Compare—

यदायम्प्राप्तोऽशोः श्लोकः सिद्धिमुच्छतिः ।

तदाप्येव येनेत्यादौ. सादृश्यवाचकः ॥

यदा पुनर्यं लाकारादिद्वयं बहिर्कल्पितम् ।

तदाप्येव येनेत्यादौ. रीतिवत्तापर ॥

(xi) The fourfold requirement of an उपमा, viz. उपमेय, उपासक, सादृश्यार्थ, and सावयवता is not always present to Dandin's mind. As Viśveśvara observes (p. 19) दण्डिनस्तु
मुद्रयस्य प्रतीयमान-भावादिभिरपेक्षोपमाव्यवहारः । He has in fact

cannot constitute an अन्योन्योपमा, as the साधारणपदे in गविता विषयनि is सीतलम् and that in विपुलवि मविरति the दाहकत्व

(ii) This variety is raised to the dignity of a distinct figure called उपमेयोपमा by later Ālaṃkārikas. It has been defined by उद्भट as (p. 67)—

अन्योन्यमेव यत्र स्यादुपमानोपमेयता ।

उपमेयोपनामाहुस्त्वा पञ्चान्तरहानिगाम् ॥

Regarding the qualification पञ्चान्तरहानिगाम् in the above definition प्रतापोरन्दुरात्र observes—नात्र उपमानोपमेयभावे तात्पर्यं किंतु एतदेव दूयमेवैव विद्यते नन्वन्वदेतयो. सदायं वस्तुन्तरं विद्यते इति । अतश्च एतदशङ्कितयव्यतिरिक्तस्य पञ्चान्तरस्यात्र हानेर्विहितत्वात् परस्परमुपमानोपमेयभावो न दुष्यति । It is doubtful however whether Dandin is here thinking of the तृतीयमदशव्यवच्छेद as much as of the heightening of their mutual excellence — अन्योन्योत्कर्षसंमिती. This implies that both the उपमेय and the उपमान must be प्रकृत, as nobody would spend any effort in showing forth to advantage the charm of what is not the theme on hand. Compare the examples given by हेमचन्द्र and अण्णयदीक्षित as quoted in our Sanskrit Commentary. Bhoja (iv. 23) calls this उभयोपमा.

(iii) In नियमोपमा (ii. 19) the तृतीयमदशव्यवच्छेद is expressly made. Here it is implied only. The implication is to be explained as follows—चन्द्र इव मुखाभिनि मुरे चन्द्रगाम्ये वक्ष्यते चन्द्राय मुखगाम्यमयत निर्वर्तते साधारणपदमन्योपमानुगामिनि । तत्र चन्द्रं मुखगाम्यं शब्दं वक्ष्यमानं मुखचन्द्रः । अस्माकं साम्यं न नान्येनेति स्यात् । अत्र चन्द्र इव मुखाभिनि । अत्र चन्द्रो मुखे चन्द्रः । (p. 176)

iv. Bhamaha recognises दूययोपमा as a distinct figure and it is worth observing that Dandin does not feel the necessity of criticising the recognition of the उपमेयोपमा as a distinct figure as he has done for instance in the case of अन्योन्योपमा. पञ्चान्तरहानिगाम्य and उद्भटवद्वय (ii. 358-359) which are figures admitted by Bhamaha. It is clear that this part offers any justification for regarding दूययोपमा as a distinct figure. As for as the circumstance goes therefore we cannot establish any conclusion either way regarding the chronological relation between उद्भट and मञ्जु.

Notes to II. 19-20—(i) In अनियमोपमा the तृतीयगद्यव्यवच्छेद is made highly probable but is not विरहित. In नियमोपमा it is openly asserted. In अन्योन्योपमा, as we saw, it was left to be inferred. Both these varieties are recognised by the Agnipurāṇa. The अलङ्कारदीप्ति defines नियमोपमा as—यत्र इतरस्यातृत्या साम्यलाभः ।

Notes to II. 21—(i) In धर्मोपमा there is only a single common quality sought to be expressed; in the present variety a large number of these are mentioned; in अतिराधोपमा, the next variety, their number is so overwhelming that the poet contents himself by stating just the one solitary aspect or quality which is not common. Again, in समुपयोपमा more than one साधारणधर्म is brought in; in बहुपमा (II 40) more than one उदाहरण is adduced. The result is that while in the former between the उदाहरण and the उदाहरण a number of distinct common qualities are sought to be conveyed, in the latter it is the intensity of the one self-same quality that stands out prominently. The variety is recognised by the Agnipurāṇa.

Notes to II. 22—(i) See Note (i) to II 21. This variety fails to produce the impression of an identity between the उदाहरण and the उदाहरण because the शब्द is not entirely *सम* as happens in a *सम* (see II 26, below). At the same time it must be remembered that the solitary शब्द between the उदाहरण and the उदाहरण which is put forward is not meant to suggest the superiority or the inferiority of the one over the other, as is the case, for instance in *विशेषण* उदाहरण and the *Alakāra* called *सम* (II 19).

(ii) This variety is not recognised by the Agnipurāṇa unless we choose to identify it with what the Purāṇa styles *सम* which is thus defined (385 13) —

समं त्वं सत्यं वेदस्य विद्वत्तया ।

सत्यं त्वं सत्यं वेदस्य विद्वत्तया ।

The Agnipurāṇa, as it is said in passing, does not recognise *सम* as a distinct figure of speech, whereas

Dandin who does it can only be supposed to have distinguished between अतिशयोपमा and व्यतिरेक in the manner above indicated. A good example of this variety is given by the अलंकारसौख्य (p 30)—

कल्पद्रुमो न जानाति न ददाति बृहस्पतिः ।

अयं च अगनीज्जानिर्जानाति च ददाति च ॥

Notes to II, 23—Dandin seems to have been alone in recognising उत्प्रेक्षितोपमा as a sub-variety of Upamā. We have already indicated in a general way (cp. Note (x) to II, 14) the distinction between उक्ता and उत्प्रेक्षा. Utprekshā may be said to be more particularly concerned with that human faculty which, Shakespeare tells us, "bodies forth the forms of things unknown and gives to airy nothing a local habitation and a name." In a regular Utprekshā it is the actual साम्य between the उपमेय and the उक्ता—or some aspect connected with it—that is poetically conceived. In the variety before us there is an उत्प्रेक्षा; but it has nothing to do with the साम्य between भुरग and पद्म which is the immediate subject of assertion. The उत्प्रेक्षा comes in only secondarily: the poetic fact of the stanza could have been expressed without bringing in the 'bragging of the Moon':

this is not a regular उत्प्रेक्षा but merely an उत्प्रेक्षितोपमा. The Com. धनानुसन्धिनी however explains—यस्य ब्रह्मविद्वत्-
शार्ङ्गधराया इमेभ्योपाख्यानमुपेक्षा । अत्रापि भुरगधियं वन्दे निरस्य पद्मेऽपि तदुत्प्रे-
क्षावचनात् उत्प्रेक्षितोपमेति ।

Notes to II 24—(i) उद्भूत, as the more difficult reading and also the one intrinsically more poetic, seems to be the genuine reading which got ousted by the more familiar word मुद्भूत

(ii) This variety has been admitted by the Agbhī-purāṇa and is thus defined (344 16)—

प्रेक्षोक्तयोरभिहितोपमयोऽयं प्रतियोगिनि ।

अविनोपमौयते या प्रथमे सादृशोपमा ॥

To assert that the प्रतियोगिन् (—उपमान) resembles or can resemble the अनुयोगिन् only under conditions impossible of fulfilment is in effect to say that the उपमेय is without a peer. As the conditions are अद्भुत or वेदोक्त्यासंभवि the variety is called अद्भुतोपमा, the अद्भुतता consisting not in the component elements (उद्भूतध्रुवद्विज, विभ्रान्तलोचनच etc.) taken by themselves, but in the peculiar combination of them that is demanded: अद्भुतोपमायां निद्रस्य धर्मिणो धर्म्यन्तरा-व्यवयोगो अद्भुतः as Ca remarks. The Alamkāraśekhara calls this same variety अभूतोपमा (defined, p 30, as—यथा-गण्डवृक्षद्वयेन संमर्गमारोप्य साम्यप्रगल्भे सा), a name which Dapdin has reserved for another distinct variety (see II. 38, below.)

(II) Adbhutopamā is to be distinguished from Abhūtopamā and from Asambhavitopamā; and the distinction is rather subtle. In अभूतोपमा the presumptive उपमान is not a विशेषपरिशिष्टसम्पु wherein the विशेषस cannot coexist with the विशेष, but rather a single simple वस्तु which is nowhere to be met with in nature, as for instance the concentrated essence of the charms of all lotuses, cp. रामानन्ध वस्तुन इमेदेगभाव्यमानस्य वयनाद्भूत तेनभू-त्तममर्मिनः (श्र. II. p 30). In असंभवितापमा it is not the धर्म of a new thing which is ascribed to the प्रत्युत्पत्तिन् and which is inconsistent with it (as happens in the अद्भुतोपमा) but the अनुत्पत्तिन् is itself said to have a quality which it has never seen or known at it from another point of view for effecting the comparison between the धर्म and the धर्मिनः as an अनन्त or a non-existent उपमान is projected and in an अद्भुत manner an existing and well-known धर्म is associated with impossible विशेषs brought over from another धर्म. The ultimate result is that the धर्म remains without peer. Such is not the case in an अभूतोपमा where the point of comparison is just the धर्म of the अनुत्पत्तिन् of the धर्मिनः that the धर्मिनः (the उपमान) is expected to possess, and the comparison does become possible in that respect.

(III) The उपमान as exemplified by मृत and the Agni-पिता (which merely qualifies मृत) comes most near to अनुत्पत्ति. Itarata illustrates it (p. 51)—

हरन्तो दानमतिर्न लीलामन्परयामिनः ।

मनहजा विराजन्ते अहमा इव परंताः ॥

Here उद्यमविचक्षणता of moving mountains is an अद्भुत phenomenon. What भोज calls उद्ययोपमा is no other than this अद्भुतोपमा. Bhoja's illustration is the verse उभो यदि ध्योमि etc; regarding which he remarks (p 352)—अद्योपमानार्थमुद्ययोपमेवेन प्रतीयमानमभिधीयमानं च सादृश्यमभिहितमिति सेषमुद्ययोपमा । Hemachandra (p. 247) unsuccessfully attempts to make a sort of a distinction between उद्ययोपमा and अन्वितोपमा; but the most clear presentation of that view is to be seen in Rudrata viii. 13-16. Mammata regards Dandin's अद्भुतोपमा as a subvariety of अनिययोक्ति.

Notes to II. 25—(i) Mohopama springs from the close similarity between the उपमेय and the उपमान, so close that a rational being would go to the length of actually mistaking the one for the other. This variety is accordingly not only a step in advance of अनिययोपमा (where the element of difference was consciously realised) but in advance of रूपक, where the भेद is completely submerged, though it is there at the back of one's consciousness so that an actual blunder cannot arise

(ii) In सद्योपमा (ii. 26) the person is struck by the close similarity but is still doubting. If he perceives the उपमान as उपमान the result would be निर्णयोपमा (ii 27); but if he perceives the उपमान as उपमेय, the result would be मोहोपमा. Again, if after a temporary but actual error the person corrects himself and perceives the thing as it is, the result would be तत्त्वव्यानयोपमा (ii 36). As between निगद्योपमा and तत्त्वव्यानयोपमा it is to be noticed that while in both the ultimate perception is a real perception, in the former it is preceded by a moment of doubt or hesitation, in the latter by one of actual blunder

(iii) All the four varieties of उपमा just considered must be based upon सादृश्य. If the doubting or the blundering is the result of normal causes mentioned in—

कामदोषमयोन्मादबोरस्वप्नाभुषण्युता ।

अन्यथापि व्यक्तं हि उपमानं विज्ञानमिह ॥

pendent figure. Now Bhāmaha thus defines and illustrates the figure (iii 42-43)—

लामानेन गत्यै च भेदं च वदत पुन ।
 समेदेहं वचं वृत्तये गत्येदेहं विदुषंषा ॥
 विमर्थं वागी न ग रित् विगतने
 कुसमापुषो न धनुस्य वीसुनम् ।
 इति विलम्बादिमृगोपि मे] मर्त-
 म्बदि वीक्षिते न लभेथेनेधदम् ॥

But we do not have merely in that fact any certain indication that Daśarhin could have meant no other writer but Bhāmaha

Notes t II. 28-29—(i) These two varieties differ from धर्मोद्गा (ii 15) only in the added circumstance that the मुख्यधर्म is here expressed by paronomastic words, the श्लेष being आर्थ in the former and वाच्य in the latter (श्लेषे खलु अर्थश्लेणेन गम्यम् अत्र वाच्यश्लेणेन) The two varieties can therefore both of them in a sense be called उद्गापना, as has been done by the author of the अक्षरमाला who gives the joint example (p 30)—

नमालयराभरणा गजने विलम्बद्वया ।
 वालेरोद्यानमालये गान् गाननशांभवी ॥

fight for superiority between the उपमान and the उपमेय about pre-eminence in this quality is represented as still undecided in विगोपेयमा (ii. 33). In निन्दोपमा the claim of the उपमान is allowed in regard to the common quality, but certain *extraneous* facts are adduced (e. g. बहुव्रजम्न, दययालुः, etc.) which should lower it and consequently the उपमेय also in our estimation. In प्रतिदोषोपमा (ii. 34) the उपमान is represented as fighting a forlorn fight for regaining its normal pre-eminence in respect of the common quality. All these varieties therefore can be regarded as उपमा varieties, because underlying them all is the presupposition that the उपमान and the उपमेय have a certain specific quality in common; and the question at issue merely is, who has the quality to a greater or less degree. The figure-of-speech called व्यतिरेक (ii. 180) has also to be distinguished from these उपमा varieties, in regard to which see our Notes to ii. 180.

(ii) As observed before, भग्न and the author of the Agnīpurāṇa mention these two varieties of उपमा, and their recognition is criticised by Bhaṁṣa (see Note (vii) to ii. 14, above). The illustrations for them given by Bharata are (xvi 49-50) —

प्रतीमाया यथा—

रष्ट्रा तु ना विनालाक्षी मुनाय मनुजार्जय ।

मुनिभिर्गोपिता कच्छाल मिद्धि मानमर्जयामव ॥

निन्दा यथा—

मा न मर्त्यगुणैस्तान् मन्वेजे कश्चिच्छविम् ।

वानरं नोक्तं [वने स्पर्शकं] वडो दवडोपमव उपमा

From these it would seem that Bhaṁṣa is really right when he says (iv 27 गण) — *एतत्तु उपमायाः प्रयोगः ।* What is intended by this statement is that the उपमान is therefore उपमानमात्रस्य वक्ष्यप्रधानम् as the उपमेय serves. Dandin however seems to have taken a different view of the case. Whether he was the first or so is however difficult to decide. The निन्दोपमा as defined and illustrated in the Alamkarasekhara comes to the प्रतिदोषोपमा (ii 34), for there the definition

is—यत्रोपमानस्य निन्दया प्रतिक्षेपः सा निन्दोपमा, and the illustration—

नागेन्द्रहस्तास्त्वत्रि कर्षेणवादेवान्तरोत्थान् कदम्ब विरोधः ।
सन्ध्यापि सौके परिणादि ह्यर्प जातास्तदुर्वोद्यमानवाह्या ॥

Notes to II. 32—See note (vii) to II. 14 above. Because no other Alamkāra writer known to us (except Vāmana) mentions शक्तिरूपोपमा and because Bhāmaha criticises the recognition of this variety, it would be perhaps unsafe to conclude that Bhāmaha must have meant Dandin alone, seeing that a vast amount of literature known to Bhāmaha and even mentioned by him by name is no longer available to us

Notes to II. 33-34—See Note (i) to II. 30 above. The variety called प्रतिक्षेपोपमा it must be admitted comes nearest to the व्यतिरेक; we can possibly distinguish them from each other by supposing that in प्रतिक्षेपोपमा the point at issue is the degree of वर्तन् or आह्लादजन्य (the common quality) of the उदयवन्तद्विम्बविराट् इन्द्र and the सूर्य. Both possess it and the moon is declared to be not a match to the face as far as the possession of this quality goes. In व्यतिरेक some quality or qualities are stated wherein the रमान and the व्यतिरेक are declared to be equal to one another but at the same time another distinct quality possessed by the रमान and denied to the व्यतिरेक is adduced which serves to establish the superiority of the रमान over the व्यतिरेक considered as a whole.

easier substitute for कस्याम्. The word कस्या is Vedic regarding which see Nirukta ii. 2.

(ii) As Dandin himself tells us (ii. 358), this variety was regarded by others as constituting a distinct alamkāra called अतन्वय. Bhāmaha thus defines and illustrates it (iii 44-45)—

यत्र तेनैव तस्य स्यादुपमानोपमेयता ।
असादयपरितोषानस्तमिष्यादुरतन्वयम् ॥
ताम्बूलदामनस्य स्तुतदशनरीधिति ।
इन्दीवगमनयनं तथैव वदन् तव ॥

The stock example of this alamkāra is the one given by Vāmana (iv. 3. 14.)—

गगनं गगनादारी गगनः सागरोपमः ।
रामगदगयोर्युद्धं रामगदगयोरिव ॥

(iii) As अन्योन्योपमा results in द्वितीयमप्यवच्छेद so अभाषणोपमा results in द्वितीयमप्यवच्छेद. In the अन्योन्योपमा example in II. 18 आनन is both उपमान and उपमेय, but in different sentences; whereas in अभाषणोपमा in one and the same sentence the face becomes both उपमान and उपमेय. It must be distinctly understood, however, that if yesterday's face is compared with to-day's face of the same lady that becomes an ordinary उपमा pure and simple. In other words, between मृग the उपमेय and मृग the उपमान in the example under discussion there must be only कल्पितभेद and not देहाद्यवयवविशेषादिकृतभेद. In the same way the verse—

तन्वने प्राप्ते मृदुमृदुतिदमस्यमर्षमेव ।
अनुदमि मृगस्य मया वामादेर्दक्षिणादेव ॥

does not contain an अभाषणोपमा, but is merely a वस्तुमा. Nor again does the verse given by Dandin later (i. 276)—

अथ वा मम शिरसि हृदयं शिरसि ममस्य ।
वादेभ्यो मम शिरसि हृदयं ममस्य तु ॥

which is observed in the *Uttara* (iv. 3. 14) —
अथ वा मम शिरसि हृदयं शिरसि ममस्य ।
वादेभ्यो मम शिरसि हृदयं ममस्य तु ॥
मम शिरसि हृदयं शिरसि ममस्य ।
वादेभ्यो मम शिरसि हृदयं ममस्य तु ॥
This is an example of this variety.

(iv) In अग्राहारणोपमा although the face is declared to be without a peer the form of the assertion is conceived outwardly in the manner of an उपमा. Where however even this outward form is not preserved that is recognised by जगन्नाथ as a distinct figure called अगम. As he says (p. 210 f.)—
 सर्वैर्योगमाननिर्देशो गमाद्यलंकारः । यथा—
 भुवनत्रिरूपेण मानवैः परितूर्ये विपुलेषु दानवैः ।
 न भवितुमि नानि नाभवत्तु यमे भवते तुल्यपदम् ॥

अत्र सर्वैर्योगमाननिर्देशेन सादृश्यस्याप्रतिष्ठानाद्योपमागमयोपि । This however is over-subtlety for which Jagannātha has been taken to task by the author of the Ālankāra-kauṣṭubha (p. 174)

Notes to II. 38-39—See Note (ii) to ii. 24 above. In regard to the illustration given for अग्रेभारिणोपमा it has been well observed (anent the ruling that उपमान must be लोकाग्रसिद्ध while चन्द्रप्रभवविश is not लोकाग्रसिद्ध)—अत्र चन्द्रप्रभवविशदेर्वा-
 गुणमाया अविवक्षितत्वात् किं तु यथा चन्द्रसिद्धाद्विशमग्रेभारिणो यथा लब्धुमन्त्रा-
 पुण्या वाग् इत्युपमास्वीकारात् । एवं च अग्रेभारिणोपमा इत्यस्य अग्रेभारिणोपमा-
 नकत्वं नार्थः किं तु अग्रेभारिणत्वं तदुपमाया साधारणधर्म इत्येव ।

Notes to II. 40—(i) Compare Note (i) to ii. 21 above. Bharata already tells us (xvi 43)—

एकमेवेन वा वार्ता एवम् बहुभिन्नया ।

अनेकेषां तथैवेन वार्ता बहुभिन्नया ॥

And his examples in order are—नृप्य ने राक्षसा वधम्, वत्सा-
 दृष्टा प्रयागने उदेत्पि, श्वेतवर्णभागात् तु नाल and पना इव राजा । Here of course, in its most primitive form, the distinction is made to depend upon whether the उपमान or the उपमेय or both are in the singular or the plural gender. Now मालादमा (ii 42) is एवम् बहुभिन्न उपमा and in Dandin's statement the distinction between वदमा and शालोपमा is this. In वदमा a number of उदाहरण are adduced in the hope that in their cumulative effect at least they would approximately convey the extent of the common quality possessed by the उदाहरण which they are unable to do singly. In शालोपमा on the other hand any one of the several उदाहरण is conceived as being adequate by



(iv) In अमार्गोपमा although the face is declared to be without a peer the form of the assertion is conceived outwardly in the manner of an उपमा. Where however even this outward form is not preserved that is recognised by जगन्नाथ as a distinct figure called अमम As he says (p. 210 f.)—सर्वेवोपमानिरेवममार्गोपमाः । यथा—

भुवनत्रिवेपि मानवे परिपूर्णं विबुधैः दानवे ।
न भविष्यति नास्ति नाभवन्मृतं दमे भजते तुल्यपदम् ॥

अत्र सर्वेवोपमानिरेवेन गार्हपत्यप्रतिष्ठातोपमागन्धोपि । This however is over-subtlety for which Jagannātha has been taken to task by the author of the Alamkāra-kaustubha (p. 174)


Notes to II. 38-39—See Note (ii) to ii. 24 above In regard to the illustration given for अममविरोपमा it has been well observed (ancient the ruling that उपमान must be लोचप्रसिद्ध while चन्द्रप्रभविरोपमा is not लोचप्रसिद्ध)—अत्र चन्द्रप्रभविरोपमा-शुभादा अविवक्षितत्वात् किन्तु यथा चन्द्रसिम्हप्रतिमभाविरोपमा तथा मनुष्य-पुराणा वाग्वद्व्युत्पत्तिर्वासात् । एवं च अममविरोपमा इत्याय अममविरोपमा-नवत्वं नार्थं किन्तु अममविरोपमा मनुष्यायाः गार्हपत्यपदम् इत्येव ।

Notes to II. 40—(i) Compare Note (i) to ii. 21 above. Bharata already tells us (xvi. 43)—

एवमेवेन सा वार्ता एकस्य बहुभक्त्या ।
अनेकेषां तथैव वदन् वदुनिगता ॥

And his examples in order are—मुख्येन ते लक्षणा वचनम्, इत्या-
दृक् प्रवृत्तानि श्रौतानि । देवर्षिप्रमाणं न तुल्यं । and यथा इव गताः ।
Here of course, in its most primitive form, the distinction is made to depend upon whether the उपमान or the उपमेय or both are in the singular or the plural gender. Now मनुष्येण (ii. 42) is एकस्य वदन् उपमान and in Dandin's statement the distinction between वदन् and मनुष्येण is this. In वदन् a number of उपमान are adduced in the hope that in their cumulative effect at least they would approximately convey the extent of the common quality possessed by the उपमेय which they are unable to do singly. In मनुष्येण on the other hand any one of the several उपमान is conceived as being adequate by

Notes to II. 43-45—(i) By वाक्य Dandin seems to have meant a complete utterance of a thought setting forth all its वाक्य relations: in other words a picture with all appropriate details and back-ground. The face, the eyes, and the teeth form one set as against which is placed the lotus, the bees, and the pollen in the first example; and similar corresponding sets are present in the second example. And when in this manner an अवयवार्थम् अवयविन् is compared with another similar अवयविन्—with the trifling subsidiary distinction of the presence or absence of an additional independent वाक्य for each अवयव—the result is a वाक्यार्थोपमा. Hence it is that after dividing उपमा as shown below—



the author of the *Alamkāraustubha* cites stanza ii 43 as an example of भेदे परंपरिता, the comparison between one pair of उपमान and उपमेय leading on to and depending upon the next pair

(ii) In the two examples of वाक्यार्थोपमा given by Dandin the समान्यम् between the various pairs of उपमान and उपमेय in each is clearly felt although not actually expressed. But it is not absolutely necessary that there should be this वाक्यार्थोपमा everywhere. The अलङ्कार-दोषर cites the following where there is प्रत्येक वाक्यार्थोपमा—

वाग्मिनीनयनकञ्जतपह्नादु रणे मदनमल्लहादु ।

वाग्मिनीनयनमल्लहादु रणे मदनमल्लहादु ।

करतलमाताम्रत्वेन अम्भोदमनुकरोति In समुदयोपमा (ii. 21) we had a similar presentation of the similarity, only there a number of हेतुs were adduced to bring out the साम्य between the same उपमेय and उपमान; while in the example before us a number of हेतुs are adduced to bring out the साम्य between one and the same उपमेय and a series of उपमानs with which it is to be compared.—As in वदूपमा (ii. 40) or मालोपमा (ii. 42) a series of successive उपमानs are here given but that वेवित्य upon which this variety primarily turns is the presentation of the साम्य in the form of a हेतु It is perhaps not essential that the हेतुs (and the उपमानs) in a हेतूपमा be always more than one

Notes to II. 51-56—(i) Like गुणs the दोषs have been most elaborately treated by Indian Ālamkārikas They have been named and classified according as they belong to syllables, words, sentences, sense, sentiments, and alamkāras A detailed treatment of these is given in the Sāhityadarpaṇa vii, or Kāvyaaprakāśa vii. Dandin affords a treatment of them in this place and later in iii 125-185 In regard to the Upamādośhas our Sanskrit Commentary supplies the needful supplementary information from Vāmana, Bhoja, and other writers.

(ii) The extra line in ii. 56 which we have enclosed in square brackets, like a number of other lines and verses, is clearly an interpolation, but having been once accepted in the editio princeps of Premachandra and so passed on into works of reference it would have been most inconvenient to omit them and so change the subsequent verse-numbering In one place (ii. 158-163) where a transposition of stanzas was felt by us to be on critical grounds absolutely called for we have for the same reason transposed the stanzas and retained their original verse-numbering, believing that nobody would grudge us giving credit for being able to count the numbers from 158 to 163 correctly

Notes to II. 57-63—(i) Dandin's list of सादृश्यमुख words is *helpful and is in any case borrowed from him by most subsequent writers, and naturally with variations and attempts at completion*. Thus the अनेकार्थशब्दम् supplies words like पुरा चेत, सौदर, and their synonyms, and even the Ms variants add one or two more. As the matter is not very vital we did not think it necessary to go into all these later lists with a view to determine the text of Dandin's list, especially as it would have been necessary not only to refer to the printed editions but even the Ms material of these other alamkāra works.

(ii) The colophon इत्युक्तमवश्यम् (and other similar colophons to mark the conclusion of the treatment of an alamkāra with a number of subdivisions) is generally given in Mss. with omission of इति and substitution of synonyms like गद्य etc for च and other small variants. We have ignored the variants and have generally followed best Ms. authority in giving the colophons or omitting them.

Notes to II. 65—(1) The name of this figure is thus explained—यदा न विधाय (उपमानमन्वयः) विधाय (प्रकृतमुपमेयम्) रूपान्तरं करोति तदा अन्वयार्थान्तरं स्पष्टम्. *Upaśāha* has to be carefully dis-

(iv) A समासोक्ति (see ii. 205, below) involves an assertion about the अप्रस्तुत which suggests a corresponding assertion about the प्रस्तुत, one assertion being made to do duty for both on the basis of an implied आरोप of the अप्रस्तुत upon the प्रस्तुत based upon सादृश्य. However, in a समासोक्ति the प्रस्तुत is not actually expressed as in a रूपक, and it is because the व्यवहार predicated of the अप्रस्तुत resembles the व्यवहार of the प्रस्तुत which is intended to be described that the प्रस्तुतप्रतीति results by way of an implication. In Rūpaka, on the other hand, the अप्रस्तुत in its entirety (रूप, व्यवहार, and all) is identified with the प्रस्तुत but, at the same time, the basis of this identification or superimposition is not actually expressed. Cp on the point माहिल्यदर्पण (p 534)—रूपके अप्रस्तुतम् आत्मस्वरूप-मनिवेशेन प्रस्तुतस्य रूपमवच्छादयति । इह तु स्वावस्थासमारोपेणावच्छादितस्वरूपमेव न पूर्वावस्थानो विशेषयति । अत एवात्र व्यवहारसमारोपो न तु स्वरूपसमारोप इत्याहुः । For further remarks see our Notes to ii. 205.

(v) The figure called परिणाम, which not only our author but even मम्मट does not recognise and regarding which, even between those that recognise it—हयकर, विषनाथ, विद्याकर, जगन्नाथ and अपर्यादाक्षित—there seems to be a slight difference of opinion, is in our opinion a matter of over subtlety. In the line—प्रगल्भेन हृगच्छेन वीक्षणे भोऽदृश्या ॥ १५॥ it is regarded as a रूपक the lotus or अम्ब must transfer its रूप completely to the eye or रक्ष. The eye, in other words, must lose all its character as an eye and take upon itself the character of the lotus. Accordingly अम्ब can bloom but cannot see. This is not a रूपक therefore. It cannot also be an उपाहा, for वीक्षण or प्रगल्भ्य cannot become a common property residing more prominently on the अम्बान lotus and less prominently on the अम्बान eye. We must hence invent a new figure in which the भेद between the अम्बान and the अम्बिय is निर्दिष्ट, but the result is not that अम्बान has transferred its रूप to the अम्बिय, but rather अम्बान has itself assumed the रूप of the अम्बिय so that the lotus can

एकाद्वयरूपक (with the further sub-divisions of युक्त, अयुक्त and विभक्त) may roughly correspond to एकरूपक. What is known as परम्परितरूपक with its two sub-divisions of अष्टेयमूल and श्रेयमूल are practically one with Dandin's रूपरूपक (ii 93) and व्युत्तरूपक (ii 87), while the subdivisions based on simple or serial arrangement Dandin does not recognise at all.

(viii) The Ālamkāra-kaustubha observes (p. 228) that some attempt to make out a variety of रूपक called वाक्यार्थरूपक on the analogy of the वाक्यार्थोपमा described in ii. 43ff.—वाक्यार्थे विभक्ते वाक्यार्थान्तरारोपः वाक्यार्थरूपकम् । यथा विविक्तेषु पद्मानां विशेषणानामुपमानोपमेयभावोर्थगम्यन्तथात्रापि वाक्यार्थव्युत्तरूपदार्थरूपकमर्थगम्यम् । तदुपमा—

आत्मनोऽस्य तपोदानैर्निर्मलीकृतं हि यत् ।

क्षालनं भास्करस्येदं सारसं सलिलोत्करैः ॥

This however is regarded by the majority of Ālamkārikas as निर्दर्शना. Compare the familiar example of it—

त्वत्पादनसरत्नानां यदलङ्कृतमार्जनम् ।

इदं श्रीराण्डलेपेन पाण्डुरीकरणं विधौ ॥

After a long and technical discussion the अलङ्कारकौस्तुभ-कार decides against the acceptance of वाक्यार्थरूपक, the instances quoted for it being merely those of निर्दर्शना. See further our Notes to ii 348

(ix) We have said above (Note iii) that in a *Rupaka* the common property can never be expressed as a *common property*. For a common thing has to be shared by more than one while in a रूपक the उपमान and उपमेय are conceived as but one thing. All the same there is always a common property implied as the very basis of the आरोप required for रूपक, and if this *धर्म* is expressed as belonging to उपमान alone, or primarily to the उपमान and secondarily in a sort of a reflex fashion to उपमेय, that does not violate the requirements of the figure. Consider for example the illustration in ii. 87. The compound word वसन्तयुज्ज is to be dissolved here in a manner so as to give more prominence to अयुज्ज (i. e. वसन्तवसन्तयुज्जम् according to Pāṇini II. 1. 72) and therefore the adjectives सज्जद्गोपनीयार्द्र and अमरप्रार्थ्यगोतमम् must be

Notes to II, 84-85—(i) Compare the nature of *सर्वसामान्य* (II 36). There, subsequent to an erroneous judgment (whether of the nature of *मेरु* or of *अर्द्ध*) based upon (whether of the nature of *सम्यक्* and the *सामान*, the real nature of the *सम्यक्* was finally determined upon. In the present Rūpaka variety there is just an opposite process of the mind from reality to error—only the error is not *असाम्यक्* but is a conscious poetic device which can deceive neither the speaker nor anybody else. In so far however as there is an attempt to conceal facts the name of the variety explains itself.

(ii) Dandin admits an independent figure of speech called *अर्द्ध* (II 304-305). In II 309 he alludes to what is called *सम्यक्* by which he presumably means a sub-variety of *सामान*—but there is none with this name amongst the given *सम्यक्* varieties. It is rather present stanzas he mentions a *सम्यक्*. It is rather difficult to determine in the first instance whether these are three independent *alamkāras* and in the next place what is the exact distinction between them as Dandin sees it. Now some hold that by *सम्यक्* Dandin means *सर्वसामान्य*—*सम्यक्* *सर्वसामान्य* as a puts it Cp II 16 also. Cp thinks that by *सम्यक्* is meant *अर्द्ध* or *सम्यक्*, adding *सम्यक्* *सर्वसामान्य* *सम्यक्* *सर्वसामान्य*. Premachandra explains *सम्यक्* by *सर्वसामान्य*—*सम्यक्* *सर्वसामान्य* *सम्यक्* *सर्वसामान्य* and thinks that *सम्यक्* (II 34) is what Dandin intends in II 36. Cp also agrees in this. Now in view of the fact that its outward form at least the *सम्यक्* variety exemplified in II 36 bears an unmistakable resemblance to any ordinary case of *सम्यक्* and in view further of the fact that the *सम्यक्* may be a judgment subsequent to a *सम्यक्* (as also to a *सम्यक्*) it is not impossible that in II 36 Dandin might be exactly playing the thinking in II 36. And in any case we can regard the *सम्यक्* as separate from *सम्यक्*. If *सम्यक्* II 36 we have already. As to (i) above—on the distinction from *सम्यक्* will be II *सम्यक्* II 34 as

प्रतिषेधोपमा and तस्यापदव्यपक are quite distinct on the very face of them no attempt need be made to distinguish the one from the other

(iii) But we must learn to clearly distinguish तस्यापदव्यपक from the figure अपहृति as Dandin defines it. To later writers the two are undistinguishable. Some think that in the Rupaka variety one dharmin as a whole is negated and another asserted in its place, while in the alankāra called अपहृति there is the negation of a certain dharma of the dharmin and the assertion of another instead. This, however, will not hold in the case of तस्यापदव्यपक (ii 308). A better differentia would be what is supplied by the adjective उद्गमिनगुणोत्कर्षम् in the definition, which suggests that the negated (प्रकृत, उपमेय) and the asserted (अप्रकृत, उपमान) things ought to have a similarity between them. This is not the case in the figure अपहृति where anything can be negated and another asserted in its place : cp. अपहृत्य किञ्चिदन्त्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

Notes to II. 96—(i) Regarding the sub-divisions of Rūpaka Bhāmaha says (ii 22)—यमन्वन्मुविषयमेकदेशविवर्ति च । द्विधा स्वस्मैवेष्टम् । Consequently when Dandin mentions innumerable varieties of Rupaka as being current he must have had others than Bhāmaha in his mind.

Notes to II. 97—(i) In the various definitions of Dipaka that are in the field two or three issues have been raised. In the first place, is it necessary that दीपक be based upon similarity ? Bharata, Dandin, Bhāmaha, Bhoja, the author of Vāgbhaṭālamkāra, and Viśvanātha are quite silent on the point. Rudraṭa regards Dipaka as a matter-of-fact (वास्तव) figure and not an औपम्य figure. Udbhata explicitly demands साम्य (p 14)—
आदिमध्यान्तविषयः प्रधान्येतरयोगिनः ।
अन्तर्गमनोपमाधर्मा यत्र तद्दीपकं विदुः ॥

while Vāmana (iv 3 18—उपमानोपमेयसाम्येवेष्ट किया), Ruyyaka (p 71), Mammata (p. 775—तद्वृत्तिमु धर्मेव्य प्रकृतप्रकृतान्य-

नाम), and Jagannātha (p. 322—प्रवृत्तानामप्रवृत्तानां चैव गाम्भायणधर्मा-
न्वयो दीपकः), do the same thing; though Mammata, for
instance, admits a variety of दीपक (the so-called वारक-
दीपक) where the गाम्भ्य is not in evidence. In as much
however as every Dipaka demands one word syntacti-
cally related to more than one sentence, we can
always regard the thing connoted by that word as
the गाम्भ्य, and so we need not make much of the condi-
tion about the दीपक्य being गम्भ्य, as Ruyyaka puts
it. The next issue raised is about the धर्मिन् that are
said to possess the गम्भ्य common धर्म. Most writers
insist that the धर्मिन् be partly प्रवृत्त and partly अप्रवृत्त but
they must not be all either प्रवृत्त alone or अप्रवृत्त alone.
This last, according to them is a case of तुल्ययोगिता (see
Note (i) to II 48, above). Now Dandin is not parti-
cular on this point; his examples suggest that he
admits all प्रवृत्त (e.g. II 100), all अप्रवृत्त (e.g. II 101),
and some प्रवृत्त and some अप्रवृत्त (e.g. II 99). Regard-
ing the distinction between दीपक and तुल्ययोगिता the
following extract from the अलङ्कारवर्णन (p. 296-297)
may be said to be the last word on the controversy—
अत्र वदन्ति—दीपकगोपि तुल्ययोगितायादेवान्तर्भवन्ति धर्मस्य सङ्गुनेरभयदा-
वितेयान् प्रवृत्ताप्रवृत्तत्वादिभिरेवम् आद्यान्तरभेदगोप्येति अलङ्कारोत्तरताया-
मगाधकल्पः । अन्यथा गोप्यस्य लङ्घ्यकारिणि ज्ञातव्यतायाः । तस्मात्प्रवृत्ताभेदे
प्रवृत्ताप्रवृत्तानां चैव गाम्भायण्य इति तुल्ययोगिताया एव द्वयोर्भेदा बहुमुचिता ।
तस्माद्दीपकस्य तुल्ययोगिताया भेदे वदतां प्राचीनानां दुराग्र इति तदिन्द्रियम् ।

नानाविधजनक्यानां सत्त्वानां संप्रदीपकः ।

एकवचनेन संप्राप्तो दण्डु दीपकमुच्यते ॥

यथा—

गमन्ति इमे कुसुमैश्च इति सन्निभैश्च सरोरहाणि ।

श्रीरामनिवासवनानि चैव यामिन्मग्नमन्त्रिणः ।

इति भगवतः भरतमुनिना (xxi. 55-56) दीपकस्य द्वौवर्गाश्च तत्रैव तु द्वयोः-
ज्ञानान्तर्भावयोश्चोक्तिरिति ।

(ii) A large number of varieties of Dipaka are con-
ceivable. Dandin first gives a four-fold distinction
based upon the same principle as in II 13 and then
gives three sub-varieties under each according to the
position of the common word. Regarding this last
principle of sub-division Jagannāth's remarks (p. 327)—

वस्तुतस्तु धर्मस्यादिमध्यान्तगतत्वेऽपि चमत्कारवैलक्षण्यभावात् त्रैविध्योक्तिरप्यस्मा-
त्प्रातः । अन्यथा धर्मस्य उपायुषमभ्योपान्यगतत्वे ततोऽपि किञ्चिन्व्याधिदेहाग्निने
चानन्तमेदप्रसङ्गात् । —Mammata and others, as before ob-
served, admit a variety called कारकदीपक defined in the
अलङ्कारकोस्तुभ (p. 291) as—यत्रैकमेव कारकमन्ययमेति कियान्मृद्वीषु and
illustrated by विभवाथ (p. 520) as—

दूरं समागतवति त्वदि जीवनाथे
भिन्ना मनोभवशरेण तपस्विनी सा ।
उत्तिष्ठति स्वपिति वासगृहं त्वदीय-
मायाति याति हसति भ्रमति क्षणेन ॥

In connection with this variety another similar gra-
tuitous principle of sub-division (not enunciated by
Dandin) turns upon the case of the common कारक, and
so we have Dipakas of कर्तृ, कर्म, कर्ण, संप्रदान, अपादान, संबन्धिन,
and अभ्यकरण—all severally illustrated in the अलङ्कारकोस्तुभ
pp 292 ff. Regarding कारकदीपक Jayaratha remarks
(p. 133)—अथ कियान्मृद्वीषु प्रस्तुतानामेकपादगतत्वेन समुचीयमानत्वाच्च समुच्चयार्थे-
कागे न तु कारकदीपकम् । तदि प्रस्तुताप्रस्तुताना कियान्मृद्वीषुमद्वारे भानि ।
Similar remarks are also passed by Jagannātha
(pp 324 325). The varieties illustrated by our author
in II 109 II 111 II 113 are an attempt to combine the
कारकदीपक with the शैव्य of some other figure or mode
of expression while the शैव्य variety and other chain-
varieties can always be superadded to almost every
figure of speech. This slankara is liable to निरूपक-
न्यून्य (illustrated by Jagannātha, p. 328 f.) which
makes the syntactical relation rather difficult to
establish.

Notes to II 98 102 (i) The first line of II 99 seems to
have been misinterpreted by Böhtlingk. The elephants
are of course the same war elephants and not 'the
most fragrant' &c. &c. &c.

Notes to II 103 104 (i) The distinction between the
Dipaka variety illustrated in II 106 and the Figure
called शैव्य illustrated in II 332 333 consists in the
fact that while the former has to be applied severally in the

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
 DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY
 5710 S. UNIVERSITY AVE.
 CHICAGO, ILL. 60637
 U.S.A.

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repetitions cannot be dispensed with, while in an अङ्गि the sense of the passage does not suffer by doing away with the repetitions. In other words, अङ्गि can be turned into a दीर्घ while यमर cannot be so transformed.

Notes to II. 120—(i) Different views about the nature of Ākṣhepa are current and naturally the definitions of this figure differ from writer to writer. Dandin's definition—प्रतिषेधोक्तिराक्षेपः—is the simplest in the field and of widest application. As Jeggannātha (p. 424) remarks—
इतरे तु निषेधमात्रमाक्षेपः । वचनद्वयस्य चार्द्धपरमात्मन्यन्यत्राक्षेपः । तत्र व्यङ्ग्यार्थे गतिः गमनतीति मध्यद्वयो निषेधः सर्वोच्चाक्षेपार्थद्वयः । Others delimit the field of this alamkāra to the negation of the उपमान alone. As Vāmana (iv 327) says—उपमानाक्षेप-
क्षेपः । तुल्यकार्यार्थस्य नैरर्थक्यविवक्षायामाक्षेपः, as he explains the Sūtra in his Vṛtti. Vāmana's example is—

तस्याश्रेष्ममुखमलि सोम्य मुभयं किं पार्षणेनेन्दुना
मोन्दयाम्य पदं दृष्टौ यदि च ते किं नाम नीलोत्पलेः ।
किं वा कोमलकान्तिभिः किमलये मन्येव विम्बाधरे
हा धातुः पुनरुक्तवस्तुरचनारम्भेष्वपूवं प्रह ॥

This is the same as प्रतीपालंकार which Mammata (p. 894) thus defines and explains—

आक्षेप उपमानस्य प्रतीपमुपमेयता ।
तस्यैव यदि वा कस्या तिरस्कारनिबन्धनम् ॥

अस्य ध्रुवः सुतरामुपमेयमेव बोद्धुं प्रोक्तमिति केमन्थेन यत् उपमानमाक्षिप्यते यदपि तस्यैवोपमानतया प्रतिद्वय उपमानान्तरविवक्षया अनादरार्थमुपमेयभावः कथ्यते तत्र उपमेयस्योपमानप्रतिफलवर्तिन्यात् उभयरूपे प्रतीपम् । As we have seen Mammata's second Pratiśpa is the same as Dandin's विपर्ययोपमा (ii 17), while Dandin's प्रतिषेधोपमा (ii 34) perhaps comes nearer to the first kind. The प्रतिषेधालंकार recognised by the कुवलयानन्दकारिकाकार (stanza 164) is of course a different species altogether.

(ii) Others introduce other delimiting conditions. They say for instance that while आक्षेप is a प्रतिषेधोक्ति it ought not to be a real downright प्रतिषेध. The thing intended ought to be conveyed (in an even more telling fashion) by the apparent denial of it. As the Ālamkārasarvasva (p. 114) clearly puts it—

विमर्शमिव्यादिना प्रथमरेखावि निंदितस्यैवकायिना वाक्येन समर्थने विद्यते इत्यर्थे
 युद्धो निदेशादेषः । —As to Bhavishyat Akshepa it is to be
 noted that it is not the same as the भव्यमानविषय variety
 of the other school; for in that variety वस्तुव्यवहारो विद्यमाने,
 whereas here it is the *thing* that might happen in
 future that is attempted to be averted by anticipation

Notes to II. 127-130—(i) Compare the illustration given
 in II. 127 with the illustration of Virodha in II 337.
 Most modern writers would regard both as cases of
 Virodha. It will however be observed that while
 the second line of II. 127 is enough to make it an ex-
 ample of Virodha, it is the first line with its denial of
 'tenderness' that makes the verse an example of
 Akshepa.

(ii) The principle underlying these two varieties is
 the same as that in II 15-16

Notes to II 131-132—(i) The example is of the nature of
 an attempt to deny an actually existing fault and the
 consequent fear. The epithet अयम् is to be noted.
 Now in a Vibhāvān (II 109) there is a negation of the
 cause but an assertion of the effect leading to a
 guessing of some subsidiary cause. Here there is a
 negation of the [यथा or principal] cause (दृष्टः) but
 likewise a negation of the effect (अयम्). In addition
 there is an assertion of subordinate causes of fear such
 as अयम् etc. together with a negation of their effect viz
 fear. Thus fear is an effect of दृष्टः (अयम्) as well as
 of अयम् (अयम्), and if the principal cause is said
 to be lacking there is nothing unusual if the result does
 not follow irrespective of whether the subordinate
 causes are or are not present. Consequently from a-
 cchandra's attempt to distinguish this figure from a Vibhā-
 vān (which is reproduced in our Sanskrit Con : errors)
 is not very much called for. The main point of the
 illustration is the denial of the existence of a
 fault by the lines

sample of *saṃdē* which combines most of these prohibition-varieties and adds some more of its own (p. 309)—

मा याद्वान्पमहत्ते प्रव पुनः सेदेन हीने वच-

सिद्धेति प्रभुता यथापि वृष्टवेशपुद्गलीनता ।

नो ज्ञावामि विना स्वयेति वचनं मभाष्यते वा न वा

तत्र किं शिक्षय नाथ यत् समुचितं वक्तुं स्वयि प्रस्थिते ॥

Our readers are probably already familiar with the classical passage in this strain from the end of the *Pūrvārtha* of Bana's *Kādambarī*

(ii) Regarding the illustration of *प्रभुताक्षेप* (II. 137) Bhoja observes (p. 427)—अथ यद्यपि यात्रोद्यमः प्रियो ल्यने [नयापि] प्रभुतार्थव्याप्तिना कारणानां गमनारम्भमेव न निवारणायाम् । अतोऽयं न रोषः किं तर्हि आक्षेप एव भवति ।

(iii) Regarding the illustration of *आशीर्षनाक्षेप* (II. 142) Bhoja observes (p. 421)—अथ यद्यपि इत्यस्य विधिवाक्यस्य ममापि जन्म तत्रैव भूयान् इत्यादिपानुदलनमेव मरणमूचनप्रतिषेधं कियते इति शुद्धोक्तं निर्याक्षेपः । The *Alamkārasarvasva* passes the following comment on the same stanza (p. 120)—अथ कयाचित् कालस्य प्रस्थानमात्मनोऽनिवृत्त्यनिवारणमुत्प्रेष्य विधीयते । न चास्य विधियुक्तः अतिशयः । सोऽयं प्रसङ्गप्रसङ्गेन निषेधमागूयति । कलं चात्र अनिष्टस्य प्रस्थानमर्थ-विज्ञानादनिवृत्त्यन्वयान्तरादित्यादिप्रतिपादनम् । एतच्च ममापि तत्रैव व्याप्तिः प्रतिषेधनातिव्यवधानादिना व्यञ्जितम् ।

(iv) Regarding the illustration of *मन्त्राक्षेप* (II. 147) Bhoja observes (p. 425)—अथ यद्यपि मन्त्राक्षेपः तत्रैव भूयान् इत्यादिपानुदलनमेव मरणमूचनप्रतिषेधं कियते इति शुद्धोक्तं निर्याक्षेपः । The *Alamkārasarvasva* passes the following comment on the same stanza (p. 120)—अथ कयाचित् कालस्य प्रस्थानमात्मनोऽनिवृत्त्यनिवारणमुत्प्रेष्य विधीयते । न चास्य विधियुक्तः अतिशयः । सोऽयं प्रसङ्गप्रसङ्गेन निषेधमागूयति । कलं चात्र अनिष्टस्य प्रस्थानमर्थ-विज्ञानादनिवृत्त्यन्वयान्तरादित्यादिप्रतिपादनम् । एतच्च ममापि तत्रैव व्याप्तिः प्रतिषेधनातिव्यवधानादिना व्यञ्जितम् ।

(v) The two stanzas about *मृदाक्षेप* (II. 155, 156) are probably interpolations. Our oldest Mss. J and N omit them, and the fact that the *Madras* edition takes them before the two stanzas dealing with *तेपाक्षेप* points to the same conclusion. The interpolated stanzas were naturally placed at the end of a series dealing with the same theme. We had to retain them in the text so as not to disturb the numbering of the *editio princeps*.

Notes:

Notes to II. 165-166—For Dandin's conception of अर्थ-
रन्ध्र see Note to II. 169 below.

Notes to II. 167-168—(i) In II. 131 the वारण itself was negated; here something else is negated on the strength of a वारण or हेतु adduced. Generally a वारण is वारक or productive cause and a हेतु a वारक or probatory cause. See II 235.

Notes to II. 169—(i) As in the case of Akshepa, Dandin's definition of Arthantaranyāsa is also rather crude and wanting in the later pruning and refining with a view to make it more precise and to delimit its field from that of other alamkāras or sub-varieties of them. To begin with, Dandin speaks of वारु प्रत्यक्ष अ-व्यय वारुनः स्यात् and वारु has been here taken to mean a theme or a complete statement, so that an ordinary हेतु of an अनुमान is naturally excluded. Compare Vamāna, Vṛtti on IV 3 21—वस्तुपरिणाम पदार्थस्य हेतुम्येवमेव कारणान्तरमप्यस्य । The figures-of-speech known as अनुमान or वारुनः (neither of which however our author admits) are in consequence differentiated from this figure. Between वारुनः and अनुमान the element of mutual distinction is the fact that in the former it is the वारुनः (to R वरु of वरु) while in the latter it is the वारुनः (to R वरु of वरु) that is set forth, and there is further the circumstance that in the figure-of-speech known as अनुमान there is ad-duced the complete paraphernalia of a logical infer-ence including the वारु. Both the figures neverth-less agree in this that both वरु the वारुनः and वरु the वारुनः are individual objects and not statements or वारु.

(ii) Objections can be taken however to the statement of the case on the ground that in an अनुमान the वारुनः is often a condensed and even con-plete statement and in the वारुनः Manuśā and others recognise a variety where the वारुनः is a वारु. Hence a better distinction between वारु and वारु

Notes

which must be carefully grasped. In an अर्थान्वयान्तर
there is always समर्थनसमर्थन relation between the two
शब्द, one being adduced in corroboration of the other.
Jagannātha gives a clear exposition of 'corroboration'
(p 471)—समर्थनं च दृढमेव दृढमेव वा आदिनि गणयन् प्रतिबन्ध
दृढमित्येवेति दृढप्रमाणम् । In प्रतिबन्धप्रमाणम् (and in Dandin's view
this embraces the so-called एतन्न—compare Notes to
II. 46) the two शब्द are merely related by an element
of similarity, upon which in fact the figure depends.
एव साम्यप्रतीतिरस्तीति in the definition. The शब्द or analogy,
it is true, may be eventually used as a corroboration
but that is not the primary and immediate object of the
figure. (Compare प्रतीतिरूपम् (p 35)—न नृप नम्य [एतन्नम्]
समर्थनसमर्थनभावप्रतीतिरिति प्रतीति विषयप्रतीतिभावमात्रम् एतन्नम् ।
अर्थादि तत्र समर्थनसमर्थनभावमात्रम् । अर्थात्तत्त्वानो नु समर्थनसमर्थन
भवेत्तद्विषयम् ।

(v) The analogical semblance required for प्रतिबन्धप्रमाण
[and एतन्न] is more likely to be found between two
general statements or between two particular state-
ments, while corroboration is usually made of a
particular by a general or of a general by a particular
statement. Most later writers accordingly introduce
the above circumstances into the very definition of
अर्थान्वयान्तर which has been accordingly defined by
Ruyyaka (viii 79)—

प्रतिबन्धप्रमाणं सामान्यं वा विशेषं त्विति चेत् ।
यत्र त्वप्रतीतिरिति त्वेति त्वेति त्वेति त्वेति ।

by Mammata (p 804)—

न समर्थनं वा विशेषं वा एतन्नं नम्य दृढम् ।
यत्र नु समर्थनमात्रम् ।

and by Jagannātha (p 471)—

समर्थनं वा विशेषं वा एतन्नं नम्य दृढम् ।
यत्र नु समर्थनमात्रम् ।

that author however does not regard this as essential
and accordingly in II. 173 he makes no particular
corroboration another particular (see Notes to the
stanza) । Mammata (II. 71) Phana (II. 61), Vaman
(II. 3. 21) and others also also non-essential define



little to distinguish them from the next pair. As it is however not absolutely necessary that all the varieties go by pair, it would perhaps involve less forced interpretation if श्रेय is given the usual interpretation of the use of words in two senses. The word दक्षिण—upon which the entire point of the corroboration turns—is so used in ii. 174. Other sub-varieties, it is true, may also use paronomastic words; but in श्रेयविद variety it is the most important word that is so used. Compare Cb—दाक्षिण्यशब्दस्य स्वाभाविकार्था बहवः । तेषु अन्यत्र साध्यतया निर्दिष्टः साधनभूतेनात्मन्यमेव साध्यते इति श्रेयविद्विदः । विरोधमपि युक्तात्मनि युक्त्यायुक्ते च अर्थान्तरन्यासे श्रेयानुबन्धे सत्यपि प्रागुक्तत्वादेव न द्वयपदेशः ।

(ii) In ii 175 the समर्थवस्तु is made up of a proposition which embraces a विरोध and it is corroborated by another proposition which also embraces a similar विरोध. The two propositions, as we understand matters, are both particular. It would accordingly be an instance of इष्टान्त in other writers; but Dandin would classify it as अर्थान्तरन्यास because the idea of corroboration is evidently the leading idea of the उत्तरार्थ. If the idea of साम्य were the more prominent one it would be, according to Dandin, a case of प्रतिवस्तुता. We consequently prefer taking the word द्वितीय in the sense of 'a good brah-

Notes to II. 176-177 —(i) The distinctive principle under-
lying the last four varieties is very elusive. In II. 176
the सम्यक् (and not the समर्थस्वत्तु also as in II. 175)
involves some one doing something improper or
against one's nature, in II. 177 both the समर्थ and the
सम्यक् propositions involve the doing of an appropriate
action: in II. 178 the action in the समर्थ proposition is
accordant for one agent but discordant for another
agent, and in II. 179 the action is discordant for one
agent and therefore accordant for another agent. Ch
and I understand विपर्यय-अस्यभावप्राप्ति or अन्याभावप्राप्ति and
explain इदं विपर्ययः [अस्य] भवति तत्रापि विपर्ययः भवितव्यम् । अतः
न, न विपर्ययः । The point is however debatable.

Ruyyaka (p 80) explains the point of the example of
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 and

Viśvanātha the author of माहिन्यदर्पण side with the older school while Jagannātha follows Mammata The following full extract from the रमयद्वाधर (pp. 352-353) will make the position on either side quite clear—
 मन्त्रप्र लामानादुपमेयस्य न्यूनत्वं व्यतिरेक इति न युक्तम् तस्य हि वाचनेनाहच-
 म्नात् । यौवनस्य चाभिरुच्ये प्रतिपाद्ये चन्द्रापिशायाधिकगुणत्वमेव विवक्षितम् यदेत-
 चन्द्रवत् याने गम्य पुनरायानमिति । [इति चेदगदेनत् ।] यतोत्र चन्द्रवत्त्वं गम्योक्तं
 यदि पुनरागच्छेत् सत् प्रियं प्रति विरमीष्याद्यनुवक्तो युज्येत । इदं पुनर्गतयोवनं
 तस्मै एव यौवनमिति चेत् पुनरागच्छेत् तस्मै पुनरागच्छेत् तस्मै पुनरागच्छेत् तस्मै पुनरागच्छेत्

.

वचने चन्द्रापिशायाधिकगुणत्वमेव विवक्षितम् न न्यूनगुणत्वम् । चन्द्रो हि पुनः पुनरा-
 गमनेन लोके मृत्तमः अत एव न तादृशमाहात्म्यवाली । इदं च पुनरायानमपुनरा-
 गमनेनानिदुर्लभतत्त्वाद्यनुवृत्तिनि मानादिभिर्मन्त्राद्यैः सादृजनभाषणीर्बहिर्दृश्या
 भवाद्या मुखा गमयितुमसाप्रतीमिति तावदुपायगुणवृत्तमुक्तत्वं एतदमेव । सवत्-
 सुगतिदानम्वयनुपायगुणवृत्तोप्युक्तोत्र वाक्यार्थपरिपोषाय गह्वर्यसरणिमवतरति ।
 अन्यथा विमित्तस्य चदर्थयौवनस्य कृते मया मानादिरस्यते यातु नाम यौवनमिति
 प्रतिवृत्तेनार्थेन प्रकृतार्थस्यापुष्टत्वात् ।

Notes to II. 181-184—(i) As we have seen (Note (iii) to
 ii 180) it has been customary to have, along with एक
 and उभय Vyatireka, अनुभय Vyatireka with the three
 sub-varieties depending upon the manner of express-
 ing गार्हर्ष्य, each with further two-fold differentiation
 depending upon the presence or absence of अयः The
 three अयः varieties from out of these six are declared
 to be impossible Says Uddyota on Kavyaprakāsa
 pradipa (p 793)—अप्रेरं विन्दम् । उदयकेशमोरो अप्रेरेष अतिरेकस्य
 अयमलक्ष्यमुचितम् ननु यदनुवृत्ति अयेण । एवं बोधयानुवृत्ताये अयमनेददर्थ
 विन्दयेत् । To which may be added the conclusion of
 Jagannātha—इदं च अनुवृत्तिमेव इति प्रकृतमुक्तिरित्युपेक्ष्यता-
 मिदं यथावच्छिद्यतामिति ।

Notes to II. 185-188—(i) These three varieties are an attempt, after Dandin's manner, to combine the केवत्त of this figure with that of some other figure or figures.

Notes to II. 189—(i) As before observed (Note (iii) to li. 180), शब्दोपादानमादृत्य includes what is called शब्दमात्रम् as well as आशयमात्रम्. Regarding this distinction Mamma's notes (pp. 664 ff.)—यथेववादिगल्पाः सत्यताः तस्यैवोपमानताप्रतीतिरिति यद्यप्युपमानविशेषणान्वयेने तथापि शब्दशक्तिमहिम्ना नृत्त्येव पश्येत् संवत् प्र-
पादयन्तीति तन्मात्रावे श्रोती उपमा । तथैव तत्र तस्यैव (पा० V. l. 116) इत्यनेन विहितस्य वनेमादाने ॥ तेन नृत्यं मुनम् इत्यादावुपमेये एव तत्र नृत्यम् इत्यादौ चापमाने एव इदं च तत्र नृत्यम् इत्युच्यतेति नृत्यादिगल्पाणां विभक्ति-
रिति साम्यपर्यालोचनवा नृत्यताप्रतीतिरिति सामर्थ्यस्य आर्थत्वत् नृत्यादिगल्पो-
पादाने आसीत् । तदुक्तं तेन नृत्यं क्रिया चेदितिः (पा० V. l. 115) इत्यनेन विहितस्य वने स्थितौ ॥ In प्रतीयमानमादृत्य the उपमावाचकशब्द is altogether absent.

Notes to II. 190-192—(i) Compare li. 190 with li. 22. In the latter इत्येव भिदा नोन्वा emphatically declares the माधर्म्यं. In the former only the भेद is stated and the माधर्म्यं is left to be inferred. It should also be noted that li. 22 mentions a circumstance that can be regarded as इत्यनेनैकपदेन while the प्रत्ययेति of li. 190—by an easy change into प्रत्ययेति and even without it—can constitute an इत्यनेनैकपदेन.

(ii) On li. 191, which Bhoja quotes, he observes (p. 237)—अथ कान्तिमृगेशमयोः प्रतीयमानमादृत्योः अविश्रममदमो नदमात्रो च विमर्शो भेदकाविति मयोः प्रतीयमानमादृत्योः समन्वयेतिरेकः ।

Notes to II. 193-196—(i) The essence of a सामर्थ्यविरिक्त consists in the fact that in it what is offered as a भेद or distinguishing characteristic between the इमान and the इत्येव has in it an element of मर्यादा. The मर्यादा however is sufficiently subdued to allow the भेदप्रतीति to gain hold upon our mind at least in the first instance. Bhoja observes on this stanza as follows (p. 305)—

(iv) A better way of understanding the passage would probably be to regard II. 194 as forming one example of महशव्यनिरेकिता with प्रतीयमान (= शब्दानुगत) नाम्य. Thus—

उपमान—चन्द्र

उपमेय—हृग

शब्दानुपात्तनाम्य—शुद्धि, which is apprehended first (प्रतीय)

भेदक—नभस्, पयः

भेदकमादय—नक्षत्रमाश्रिता, उक्तुमुदयः; this is apprehended as an after-thought.

The only difficulty in the way of this interpretation is the two dual locatives (or genitives) connected by च in II. 195. The locatives can be translated by—"between the moon and the hansa, in regard to sky and water, a difference etc.", and च could be regarded as expletive. Bhoja, it must be added, favours the earlier interpretation. His remarks on this stanza are (p. 305)—
अत्र पूर्वार्धे चन्द्रहृगयो प्रतीयमाननाम्ययोरम्बरोत्तमन्वतोयभूतत्वे उग्रायै तु नभः पयसोर्नक्षत्रमालिन्वोत्तुमुदत्वे महशे एव भेदके । सोयं प्रतीयमानसादयवो महशव्यनिरेकः ।

Notes to II. 197-198—(i) Bhoja remarks on this illustration as follows (p. 303)—अत्र यौवनप्रभवस्य तमसः तमोजाला महश्विरोत्तरमिति मादयमुक्त्वा अल्लालोरमतायमवार्थं सूर्याग्निभिरिति व्यतिरेको विहितः । सोयं स्वजातिव्यतिरेकः ।

(ii) This stanza is made to support the weight of a chronological argument for the priority of Bāna's Kādambari over the Kāvya-darśa of Dandin—a weight which it is too weak to sustain, for, even though the conclusion be sound it should not be supported by an unsound argument. Peterson (Dasakumāra, First Edition, Preface) and Pandit Maheschandra Nyāyaratna before him (A. S. B. Proceedings 1887, p. 193) regard Kāvya-darśa II. 197 as a reminiscence of Bāna in his Kādambari, (B. S. S. p. 102, l. 16)—केवलं च नियतं एव अमृत-भेदमल्लालोरोत्तमप्रदीपप्रभाजैर्यमनिगहनं तमो यौवनप्रभवम् । Nothing need hinder us, as far as the two passages alone are concerned, from regarding the Kādambari idea as an elaboration of that in the Kāvya-darśa. More probably the two are quite independent of each other.

the same effect as if the author of the *Vāṇī* had
disputed (p. 331) — *विशेषः कश्चित् कश्चित्* इति
वाच्येन प्रतीयते । विशेषो न कश्चित् कश्चित् इति वाच्येन प्रतीयते ।
वाच्यमिति चेत् । We can in brief say that *Vāṇī* is a
general name for figures-of-speech based on *anuprasāra*
tion, and that figures as well as *anuprasāra* are particu-
lar cases of *Vāṇī* that have been recognized as
independent figures.

(iii) The contradiction involved in a *Vāṇī* need not
course an apparent contradiction which admits of an
easy solution by *anuprasāra* or *anuprasāra* itself. The
solution, however, ought to be quite easy and is
given, as Bhamaha (h. 77) and Udayana after him (p. 331)
observe, and yet at the same time there arises a some-
kind of an actual problem to be solved. Thus in the
illustration in ii. 300 *दीव* has two senses — the
primary sense, and *शङ्कादन्वय* the secondary
sense. Now *मृग* is not the cause of the *दीव* and
so there is no contradiction in the statement that the
दीव are *अशङ्का*. Such is the solution of *मृग*.
The difficulty arose from the identification of the
secondary sense of *दीव* with the primary sense.
Adapting the explanation of Jagannatha (p. 432) to the
case in point we can say — *मृग इव शङ्कादन्वय* इति चेत्
तदायकारणवेनावगतस्य व्यापारे प्रतीयते । यदायकारणव्यापारेण प्रतीयते तदा
तस्य कार्यस्योत्पत्तिरिति चेत् । *दीव* च शङ्कादन्वयनन्वयवशात् । न तु
पानमन्ता । पानं च न शङ्कादन्वयवशात् । शङ्का । अत्र तु शङ्कादन्वय-
विशेषस्य । तथा च कथमत्र विभावना इति चेत् । मुख्यं हि *दीव*ने पानमन्ता
गोणे च शङ्कादन्वयवशात् । तयोर्गोणमुच्यते । *दीव*ने शङ्कादन्वय-
अभेदाध्यवसायवशात् । तदभावे चात्र कार्याभिप्रेततया व्यवहितस्य कार्याभिप्रेत-
निरवधानात् विभावनाप्राप्तिरिति चेत् । एव चाभिप्रेततया सर्वत्र च *दीव*ने
अभेदाध्यवसायवशात् कार्याभिप्रेततया व्यवहिततया व्यवहिततया व्यवहिततया
स्थितं न बाधकतया । कार्याभिप्रेततया कारणाभावस्य च स्वभावनिवृत्त-
अत एव कार्याभिप्रेततया व्यवहिततया व्यवहिततया व्यवहिततया व्यवहिततया
वस्तुतः कारणभेदात् पानादित्यस्य *दीव*ने भिन्नं भिन्नं च शङ्कादन्वयम् । न
साहचर्यात् अभेदाध्यवसायनेन अभिप्रेततया व्यवहिततया व्यवहिततया व्यवहिततया

Notes

Notes
 नैव संभवति । अन्वयमित्याद्यन्येति प्रयोक्तिः । अग्राध पत्र प्रकाशः ।
 भेदेभेदः । अभेदे भेदः । मन्त्रधर्मग्रन्थः । अमन्त्रो मन्त्रग्रन्थः । कार्य-
 कारणयोर्वैपर्ययविशेषः ।
 marks the middle stage in this pro-
 regards अतिरूप नो

Rudrata perhaps marks the middle stage in this process of evolution in as much as he regards अतिशय not as an independent figure-of-speech but as a rhetorical device of the same kind as comparison or contrast and giving rise to a number of figures (12 in all) which he thus enumerates (ix. 1-2)—

यत्रार्धधर्मनियमः प्रमादिव्याधाद्विर्ययं याति ।
 यच्चिन्मन्त्रितिलोकं म म्यादित्यनिशयस्तस्य ॥
 पूर्वविरोधोऽप्येकाविमलनातद्व्याधिकविरोधा ।
 विमलसंगतिरिद्विद्व्यापानाद्देवो भेदाः ॥

of this is the view of

Just the opposite of this is the view of Hemachandra who says (p 267)—एवविद्ये च सर्वत्र विद्ये अतिशयोक्तिरेव प्राणव्येनाव-
तिष्ठते तां विना प्रायेणालंकारत्वाद्योगादिति न सामान्यमौचित्येकावलीनिर्द्गनविशो-
पाशुलंकारोपन्यासः श्रेयान् ।

(iii) *Atisayokti* understood in this extended sense is called *वकीक्ति* by *Bhāmaha* in the oft-quoted stanza (IL 85)—

Vakrokti is formally defined by Vāmana (iv 38) as
 नाद्वयानुशङ्का, the point being—यत्र ग्राह्यलक्षणा सद्व्यवहारेण विलम्बेन
 लक्ष्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिमुद्भावयितुं प्रयत्नते तत्र वक्रोक्तिरुक्तेरिति लक्ष्यम् ।

(iv) The most modern school as represented by Jagannātha (p 313) and others refuses to recognise the five or more sub-varieties for the figure put forward by the Middle School. As the Alankarakaustubha observes (p 285)—उपमानासमेषस्य निरादोऽयवगानमेवात्रापेक्षितम् । प्रसारितं भवतिरिचालसागरकण्ठमेवेति तत् स्थापनं । न केवलमुपमानासमेषस्यैव दायोक्तिलक्षणं संभवति यथेष्टधर्मावच्छिन्नमेतत्कारणं स्यात् । न चेतन्मूलमवनेष मवानुगतमस्तीति वाच्यम् । विविक्तैस्तैलशब्दाश्चेत्यनमवस्थामप्यप्रोक्तवान् अन्यथा उपमानासमेषस्यैव हेतुत्वमेवेति किंच उपमादीनामर्थेन हेतुत्वमेवेति । This school therefore approaches the most ancient school represented among others, by Dandin

(v) Bhoja's statement (iv 82) quoted above probably differentiates अविनाशोक्ति from इति (i 85); see also our *Sanskrit Commentary* p. 236 ll. 6-12.

Notes to II. 215-21 — (i) Verse 215 is given by Bhoja (p. 462) as an example of कान्त्यनिशय with the remark—अत्रैवं नन्ददेवः कोऽस्मीति श्रुत्येव वाङ्मन्योक्त्यनिशया येन तस्मिन् ममात्मनि श्रुत्येव निशयः न लक्ष्यते सोऽयं कान्त्यनिशयो नामानशयमेव । Hemachandra (p. 455) cites this as an example of योगे अयोग—अत्राभिप्रेत्या लक्षणक्रियायामपि योग्यतावाङ्मन्योक्त्यनिशया अयोग इत्यतः । Mammata would regard the example as containing an independent figure called मालिन or पिहितः; but Bhoja observes—अथान्यं पिहितान् मे विनोय । उच्यते । पिहितं यन्मनस्योक्त्येव निशयः तस्मात् सो विनोय इति । उच्यते । पिहितं यन्मनस्योक्त्येव निशयः तस्मात् सो विनोय इति ।

(ii) The foot-note on p. 237 contains a misprint For मयाऽद्वयान्तरं read मयाऽद्वयान्तरं for मयाऽद्वयान्तरं; and for शीतलो in the last line read शीतलो.

Notes to II. 217-218 — (i) Bhoja (p. 462) gives this as an example of अनुव नमन with the remark—अत्रैवं मध्यम्य लोकः मानसकर्मणो नाशयान्तरं वदति येन नान्यथा न कथयति । सोऽयं तदनुव निशयो नामानशयमेव ।

Notes to II. 219 — (i) Bhoja (p. 462) gives this as an example of गुणानिशयन मद्रकानिशय and remarks—अत्रैवं यद्यपि लोकः शक्यमानस्य वा नान्यथा न कथयति । यम ननुनादरमिति सङ्कीर्णनाशकृते । गाय मद्रकानिशयो नामानशयमेव । Mammata and others recognise this as an independent figure-of-speech called भावक.

Notes to II. 220 — (i) Bhoja gives other sub-varieties of this figure such as प्रसादनिशय, अनुमनानिशय, and अन्योन्यानिशय or द्विगुणानिशय.

(ii) Bhamaha also delivers himself in a similar strain (ii 84)—

द्व्येवमदिशदिता गुणानिशययोगः ।

सर्वथा । गोविन्दु महेन्द्रः ॥ ११११॥

We have already mentioned Rudraṭa's attempt to regard अलिङ्ग्य as a fundamentum divisionis for classifying figures.

Notes to IL 221-225—(i) We give below some of the more important definitions of Utprekṣā—

Agnipurāṇa (344.24)—

अन्यधोपमिता वृत्तिधेतनस्येतस्य च ।
अन्यथा मन्यते यत्र सामुद्रेशा प्रवर्तते ॥

Udbhata (p. 43)—

साम्यरूपविवक्षायां वाच्येवाद्यात्मभिः पदे ।
अनङ्गुणक्रियायोगादुत्प्रेक्षातिशयान्विता ॥

Bhāmaha (ii 91)—

अलिङ्गितगामान्दा विविधोपमया सह ।
अनङ्गुणक्रियायोगादुत्प्रेक्षातिशयान्विता ॥

Vāmana (iv. 39)—

अनङ्गुणस्यान्यवाच्यवर्तमानमतिशयार्थमुत्प्रेक्षा ।

Ruyyaka (p 55)—

अन्यवसाये व्यापकप्रधान्ये उत्प्रेक्षा ।

Rudraṭa (viii 32, 36)—

अलिसाक्यार्थैर्नर्थ विधाय गिहोपमानसङ्ग्राहम् ।
आलोप्यते च तस्मिन्नङ्गुणादीनि सौत्प्रेक्षा ॥
यत्र विशिष्टे वस्तुनि सत्यमदालोप्यते तमे तस्य ।
वाच्यन्तमुपगम्या तन्मात्रं सप्तसौत्प्रेक्षा ॥

Udbhata (p. 34)—

अत्यन्तसादृश्यादगतौचि धर्मस्य वस्तुनमुत्प्रेक्षा ।

Udbhata (iv 90)—

वस्तुना कविदोषविद्याद्वयार्थस्य सत्तेन्दया ।
सोतिनेकदिशि सादरेत्प्रेक्षा सा ह्युक्ता कथा ॥

Bhoja (iv. 50)—

अन्यधोपमिती वस्तु यस्यामुत्प्रेक्षातेन्दया ।
इदं तुल्य. क्रिया चपि तामुत्प्रेक्षां एवमुच्यते ॥

Hemachandra (p 247)—

अनङ्गुणस्यैवार्थवत्तु तस्यैव उत्प्रेक्षा ।

Vidyānātha (p 393) and Chitrāmṛtānand (p 73)—

यत्रान्यधर्मसंज्ञादन्वयेनोपनिर्दिष्टम् ।
प्रकृतं हि भवेत् प्राज्ञाभ्यामुपेक्षा प्रवक्ष्यते ॥

Vidyādhara (viii 13)—

अप्रकृतत्वेन स्यादवयवाद्यो गुणाभिर्मयन्नात् ।
सा च प्रकृतस्य यदा क्षीरान्ध्रेऽपि तदा तद्वत् ॥

Maṇumata (p 707)—

संभावनमधोपेक्षा प्रकृतस्य समेन यत् ।

Viśvanātha (x 40)—

भवेत् संभावनोपेक्षा प्रकृतस्य परात्मना ।

Jagannātha (p 285)—

तद्विप्रत्वेन तदभावात्त्वेन वा प्रमितस्य पदार्थस्य समानतद्भूतत्वं
मानाधिकरणान्तरतत्त्वमसंवाच्यमित्तकं तत्त्वेन तद्वत्त्वेन वा संभावन-
मुपेक्षा ।


And Viśve-vara (p 180)—

संभाव्यते सः यदा साम्यप्रतियोगिना तदुपमेयम् ।
तमुपेक्षामाहर्भिन्ना त्वेवादिविषयत्वात् ॥


(ii) All these definitions from the simplest to the most elaborate refer us to the essentials. The points to be noted are: 1 That it should be a संभावन = अन्ययोल्लेखन = अन्यथा व्यवहार = अन्यथा कल्पन = अन्यत्वेनोपनिर्दिष्ट = असदारोपण, i. e., अन्यद्वैकीयत्वमदः । That it should be deliberate or आह्वय and not due to actual error. 3 That it should be between things having similarity, and so based on similarity. 4 That it should be striking or pictures-que. 5 And that it should concern itself with the image or form and shape or व्यापार of the thing under discussion. Regarding this last requirement Prathārendurāya observes (p 44) अन्यथा सिद्धा गुण । साधनमावस्तु क्रिया । दृष्टं नद्वि । स्वतन्त्रपरन्त्यपरावात्मकत्वात् द्विरियम् । यद्य स्वतन्त्रः पदार्थः स समीक्षाभिधीयते । तत्र दृष्टं नास्ति सत्त्वात्मकत्वमसौयोग्यत्वात् इत्यम् । परतन्त्रस्य पदार्थस्य वनेक्यता । तस्य वैद्विक्यम् सिद्धमाध्यतामेदात् । तत्र यः सिद्धो धर्मः स गुण इत्युक्तं स ५ सा क्रिया । एवावन्त्य लोहितः पदार्थः सामान्यादीनामपि प्राचीनैरेव रूपेणानुभूतत्वात् ।

(iii) Numerous subdivisions of this figure are given by Ālaṅkārika; compare Ālaṅkārasarvasva (p. 57).


Rasagangadhara (pp 233-87), and especially Pratiparudriya (p. 386) We can exhibit them in a tabular form thus—



Further subdivisions of each of these varieties are as under—



The four main divisions of वाच्या are in this way divisible into 8 sub-varieties thus giving rise to a total of 32 varieties under वाच्या. Each of these varieties can be further sub-divided into three sorts thus—



Thus we have—

वाच्या जातिविद्या	of 24 varieties
वाच्या गुणविद्या	of 24 varieties
वाच्या त्रियाविद्या	of 24 varieties
वाच्या द्रव्यविद्या	of 8 varieties (24 varieties of 3 varieties each)
प्रतीयमान जातिविद्या	of 12 varieties (12 varieties of 2 varieties each)

read by me before the First Oriental Conference held at Poona, 1919), and this leaves it an open question as to whether Dandin was indebted to Śūdraka or to Bhāsa. Exact grounds are lacking for determining the question one way or the other; but so much we have gained by the discovery of Bhāsa's plays; we need not any more link the date of Dandin to that of Śūdraka, (or of Bhāsa). If Śūdraka is to be assigned, say to c. 600 A. D., and if reasons exist to assign Dandin to an earlier date, we can do so by making him refer to Bhāsa who gives our stanza in Chārudatta I. 19 as well as in Bālacharita I. 15. If on the other hand Bhāsa turns out to be a ninth-century play-wright (I have seen this only asserted but not actually proved or even made probable) and if Dandin comes earlier, we can still preserve our countenance and make Dandin borrow from Śūdraka. Dandin here quotes the first half of the stanza. One of our Mss. quotes the full stanza in this place and gives besides another extra stanza which is noticed in the Chitrāmṛtāṇṣ (p. 77). The full stanza is repeated also as [ii. 362] which we regard as an interpolation (see Note to the stanza).

(ii) The word *उत्पद्यते* is used in *उत्पद्यते* as well as *उत्पद्यते*. Compare Note (x) to ii. 14. In the latter half of ii. 227 Dandin is actually quoting the words of Patañjali. See our Sanskrit Commentary.

(iii) The पूर्वार्ध in ii. 228-229 can be thus exhibited. The stanza लिप्यन्ति तमेवामि contains an उत्पद्यते with—

उत्पद्यते—लिप्यन्ति	} १० तमेवामि लिप्यन्ति ।
उत्पद्यते—तमेवामि	
साधारणधर्म—लेखन	
वचन—इव	

Here of course one word is made to perform two functions, which is obviously a mistake.

(iv) In the above पूर्वार्ध the verb लिप्यन्ति was interpreted as लेखनम्पत्तर following the usual practice of the Vākyakarana or Grammarians. According to them

लिप्ति - अमुककृतं-अमुककर्म-लेखनव्यापार Now we have seen that we cannot make the व्यापार the उपमान. Can we make the simile turn upon the subordinate elements of the व्यापार, the कृतं and the कर्म? This is the point considered in li. 230. The answer is in the negative; for if the व्यापारप्रधान interpretation of लिप्ति is to be retained, the गौण factors are lost in the principal and can have no independent locus standi. This is quite obvious.

(v) The पूर्वश्रुति in li. 231 suggests that, following the Naiyāyikas, we should so interpret the verb लिप्ति as to give a non-subordinate position to the कृतं of the लेखनकिया. In this view लिप्ति=अमुक[कर्म]लिखितवत्-लेखनकुलकृतिमान्-कर्ता. So the proposed उपमा statement is—

उपमान—लिप्तिवत्तां or लेखक

उपमेय—नमस्

सादृश्यधर्म—

वाचक—इव

Now the question is, who is the लेखक? If the idea is यथा कश्चिन् पुरा [मोक्ष] लिप्ति नया नम अद्भुति लिप्ति, we obviously can connect अद्भुति with the उपमेय alone and not with the उपमान also, whereas, as a matter of fact, अद्भुति seems to be intended in the stanza as going with both. Hence Das in १४९—अद्भुतानि न मयदम् (or adopting the variant which also has good ms. authority—मयन अद्भुतानि न मयदम्). Further the point of similarity between the proposed उपमान and उपमेय (or, adopting the variant, the point in which the उपमेय is compared with the लेखक the उपमान) has got to be extraneously supplied; it is not actually given in the stanza.

(vi) Can we not as a possible alternative, connect अद्भुति with both the उपमान and the उपमेय proposed in (v) above, and in this manner—यथा कश्चिन् पुरा अद्भुति लिप्ति (or लिप्ति) नया नम अद्भुति लिप्ति. This would obviate the first difficulty of अद्भुतानि न मयदम्, but the second difficulty still remains. We can, it is true, conceivably imagine मयदम् or some such characteristic of the लेखक as the supposed common dharma, but it is १४२ and

prekshā knows of no such limitations. At the same time, while a simile is a more or less sustained effort of the imagination to hold two things together in one consciousness with a view to establish a complete picture, an Ūtprekshā is a passing suggestion of the intended similarity, which may occasionally be very picturesque and which, while it lasts, gives a point of view from which the poet wishes us to understand the fact, the quality, or the action described. Hence we would render the word by Poetic-Conception.

Notes to II, 235—(i) The three figures हेतु, सूक्ष्म, and लेख, and in this order, are enumerated by Bhāmaha (ii 86) who however says—हेतुश्च सूक्ष्मो लेखश्च नालंकारनया मतः, the view of Dandin being just the contrary. The question about the chronological relation between the two writers cannot be settled either way on the strength of this circumstance alone. Compare, however, Notes to 244 below. Other writers who recognise all these three figures by these names are भाज (iii 12, iii 21, iv 56), शङ्कर (vii 82, vii 98, vii 100), वाग्भट (p 43), and कुवलयानन्द (stanzas 166, 150, 137). Others recognise one or two of them only, subsuming the remaining under some other figure or figures. Dandin illustrates Hetu in ii 236-259, defines and illustrates Sukshma in ii 260-264, and treats of Lessa in ii 265-272.

(ii) Hetu is a poetic cause, and Indian Alamkārikas recognise a number of figures of speech based upon causal relation. These are (cp. Note (i) to ii. 2 also)—अर्थान्तरव्याप (ii. 169), विभावना (ii. 199), समर्पित (ii. 298), विशेषोक्ति (ii. 323), निदर्शन (ii. 348),—amongst the alamkāras recognised by Dandin—as also the alamkāras known as वाच्योक्ति, अनुमान, कारणमाला, अहेतु, विषम, विविध, समुच्चय, समर्पित, व्यापान, अर्थगति, etc., not to mention alamkāras like स्थान, प्रतिबन्धना, or मुख्ययोक्ति (where similarity serves to illustrate as well as to corroborate), or some sub-varieties like वाच्योक्ति or Mammata's last variety of अनिष्टोक्ति (where causal relation comes in only secondarily)

Ignoring the last two groups of alamkāras, and considering first the alamkāras not found in the Kāvya-darśa, it is to be noted that समाधि-समाहित, Dandin preserving the first word for the गुण and the second for the alamkāra. Writers like Bhoja (III. 34, iv 44), Ruyyaka (p. 163, p 169), and Viśvanātha (x. 86, x 96), it is true, recognise both समाधि and समाहित as two distinct alamkāras, but the समाहित of the last two writers is a रसात्मक, while we have already commented upon Bhoja's Samādhī as an alamkāra (see Note (ii) to II. 99). About समुच्चय we shall have something to say in the Notes to II. 298, while कारणमात्र is only the हेतु with सदसल्लोकेविषय super-added. The figure अहेतु is recognised by Bhoja (III 18), Rudraṭa (lx. 54), and वाग्भट (p. 44) comes very near to our author's विरोधोक्ति (II. 323). The figure वाच्यलिङ्ग (defined by Mammata as हेतोर्वैकल्पपर्यायता) is practically the same as Dandin's हेतु, while अनुमान is the same हेतु set forth with the usual व्याप्ति and other paraphernalia of a logical inference. For the rest compare Notes (i) to (vi) to II 169. The other figures need not be here considered in details. See however Notes on चित्रहेतु varieties.

(iii) Dandin has given illustrations for 16 varieties of हेतु of which 14 are illustrations of कारणहेतु and only 2 (viz II. 244, II. 245) are of the शङ्कहेतु. We have already (p. 127 above) explained the distinction between कारण and शङ्क हेतु, from which it will be clear that the कारणहेतु (e. g. वदति) normally precedes the कार्य (धूम), while the शङ्क is the logical mark or लिङ्ग (e. g. धूम) which in its most valid form is actually the कार्य of the शङ्कहेतु (viz. वदति). But a poetic शङ्क need not always have that rigorous validity in its व्याप्ति which logic requires. For instance in II. 245 the व्याप्ति—यत्र इन्द्रपादावाप्यध्वन्दात्ममाममाप्यध्व देहोत्पत्ता नत्र कामानुत्पत्ता—may conceivably be vitiated in a particular person who is restless, but *not* by love. It is only if the शङ्क is the कार्य of the शङ्क that the व्याप्ति is invariably valid.

(iv) An *अर्थान्तरन्यास*, as we have seen above (p 123), involves a *साध्यसाधन* relation between two things or *वस्तु*. Now although it is true that the most valid form of proof is the one that depends at each stage upon demonstrable causal relation between one thing and another, we are not always so rigorously exacting in ordinary life and much less so in poetry. Even analogy is often given and accepted as valid proof. Generally, however, the *साध्य* and the *साधन* are related as particular to universal, or vice versa. The particular is the result of the universal by deduction, while the universal is the result of the particular by induction. In *अर्थान्तरन्यास*, accordingly, the causal relation between the two statements (even where it is demonstrable) is ignored and attention is fixed upon the *समर्थनसमर्थक* relation between them. In a *हेतु*, even in the *ज्ञापक* variety, the causal relation is naturally what comes to the fore, and as the two *वस्तु*s in question are normally two particular objects (e.g. *ऊमा* and *काम* in II 245) and not two statements as in an *अर्थान्तरन्यास*, the distinction between that figure and *ज्ञापकहेतु* is generally not very difficult to make.

(v) Some important definitions of *हेतु* are given below —

Agnipurāṇa (344.29-32)—

मिमाधाधिपितार्थस्य हेतुर्भवति साधकः ।
कारको ज्ञापक इति द्विधा योग्यपञ्चायने ॥

Bhūja (III 12)—

क्रियायां कारणं हेतुः कारको ज्ञापकश्च यः ।
अभावाधिपत्रहेतुश्च चतुर्विध इहेष्यते ॥

Vāgbhaṭa (iv 105)—

यत्रोत्पादयत केचिदर्थं वस्तु प्रकाशयते ।
तन्मोक्षतायुक्तिरसौ हेतुर्लक्ष्यो वक्ष्यते ॥

Rudrata (vii. 82)—

हेतुमता सद् हेतोरभिधानमभेदहृद्भवेद्यत्र ।

सोलंकारो हेतुः स्यादन्येभ्यः पृथग्भूतः ॥

Vagbhata (p. 43)—

कार्यकारणयोर्मध्ये हेतुः ।

Viśvanātha (x. 64)—

अभेदेनाभिधा हेतुर्हेतोर्हेतुमता सद् ।

Kuvalayananda (stanzas 166-167)—

हेतोर्हेतुमता सार्धं वर्णने हेतुश्च्यते ।

.....

हेतुहेतुमनोरक्यं हेतुं केचित् प्रचक्षते ।

(vi) Of these definitions while the first two and the first given by the Kuvalayanandakāra agree with that of Dandin, *in the others is distinctly noticeable an attempt to give a special definition to the figure besides the mere fact of one thing being the हेतु of another.* Bhāmaha, it will be remembered, had already raised his voice against the recognition of हेतु as a distinct figure in as much as there was no वयोक्तृप्रतिधान in it at all; and this criticism has so much weighed upon later Ālankārikas that even so astute a writer as Jagannātha questions the validity of काव्यलिङ्ग (which with these later writers does duty for हेतु) as a distinct figure-of-speech. The view is thus set forth and criticised by Viśvesvara (p. 340 f.)—यत्तु [रसगङ्गाधरे]—काव्यलिङ्गं नालंकार कविप्रतिभानिमित्तवस्तुत्तमत्वाविशेषात्मकविच्छित्तिविरहात् । हेतु-हेतुमद्भाष्यं लोकोक्तिवत् । श्लेषादिमहिषणजन्यस्तु चमत्कार-श्लेषयुक्तत्वात् तदस्यैवालंकारत्वं कल्पयति न तु काव्यलिङ्गस्य तत्प्रयोग्यचमत्कारान्तराभावादिति सत्तुभ्यम् । लोकोक्तिरपि कविप्रतिभायाजन्यतया चमत्कारजनकत्वात् । ... । एवमुपमादेरप्यलंकारत्वं न स्यात् सादस्यस्य वास्तव्येन कविप्रतिभावर्तित्व-विरहात् ।

(vii) The sixteen varieties of Hetu illustrated by Dandin are exhibited in the following Tabular statement. Bhoja has elaborated Dandin's own scheme

Notes to II. 235-237—(i) Bhoja thus explains the illustration—नोयं मथोक्तो मन्वयमाहन् प्रीत्युपदानक्रियागमावेसात् प्रवर्तको नाम कारकदेतुभेदः ।

Notes to II. 238-239—(i) Bhoja thus explains the illustration—अत्रैवैकस्मिन् पवनस्य पथिब्रह्मसत्त्वसाधनक्रियायां कर्तृत्वेनावेसाद्वि-
वर्तको नामायं कारकदेतुभेदः ।

(ii) In II. 239^d the reading आलोचर, as being the *lectio difficilior* and as yielding a very good sense has to be naturally preferred to the other variants available.

Notes to II. 240—(i) The threefold division of कर्म here given by Dandin is also to be found in the Vākya-
padīya of Bhartṛihari (III. 45-88, कर्मविहार), some perti-
nent stanzas from the section being—

निर्वर्त्य च विकार्यं च प्राप्यं च त्रिविधं मतम् ।
तत्रेकमित्येव कर्म अनुष्ठान्यत्तु कल्पितम् ॥ ४५ ॥
औदासीन्येन यत् प्राप्तं यच्च कर्तृत्वीकृतम् ।
सहान्तरैरनाम्न्यात् सद्यसायन्यपूर्वकम् ॥ ४६ ॥
सती वा विद्यमाना वा प्रवृत्तिः परिणामिनी ।
सम्यक् नाधीयते तस्य निर्वर्त्यत्वं प्रचक्षते ॥ ४७ ॥
प्रवृत्तेस्तु विवक्षायां विद्यार्थे कश्चिदन्यथा ।
निर्वर्त्यं च विकार्यं च कर्म शास्त्रं प्रदर्शितम् ॥ ४८ ॥
यद्यगम्यायते सद्वा जन्मना यत् प्रकाशते ।
तन्निर्वर्त्यं विकार्यं च कर्म द्वेषा व्यवस्थितम् ॥ ४९ ॥
प्रवृत्त्युत्प्रेदसंभूतं किञ्चित्कृत्वादिभस्मकम् ।
विचिन्वान्तरौतस्यैवा मुक्त्यादिविकारकम् ॥ ५० ॥
वियत्कृतविशेषाणां निश्चिन्त्यं न गम्यते ।
दर्शनादनुमानाद्वा यत् प्राप्यमिति कथ्यते ॥ ५१ ॥
विशेषलाभं सर्वत्र विद्यते दर्शनादिना ।
वेद्यादिन तदभिव्यक्तिमिदिराष्ट्रविद्यादिषु ॥ ५२ ॥
यथा वैकर्म्यपदान् शब्दे भेदेन दर्शितम् ।
तथैकमेव कर्मोपि भेदेन प्रतिपदिनम् ॥ ५३ ॥
निर्वर्त्या वा विकार्या वा प्राप्यो वा साधनाधयः ।
क्रियाणांमेव साध्यत्वात् निरुपयोगिकीयते ॥ ५४ ॥

(ii) Professor K. B. Pathak (Ind. Ant. XLII, Oct. 19
p. 237) has argued that this three-fold division of कर्म
21 [Kavyāśāstra]

unknown both to Pāṇini and Patañjali—was evolved out of Pāṇini's sūtra I. iv. 49 by the genius of Bhartrihari himself, Dandin having borrowed it from Bhartrihari. No definite proof, however, has been adduced to prove that the three-fold division of कर्म was first made by Bhartrihari himself. The fragmentary Berlin Ms. of Bhartrihari's commentary on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya—the only Ms. of the work hitherto discovered—unfortunately does not go beyond I. i. 53, and we have no other clear evidence one way or the other. Seeing however, that Bhartrihari himself, as Kielhorn points out (M. Bh., vol. II, Preface p. 20), had an 'extensive commentarial literature' before him, it is unsafe to assert in the absence of compelling evidence that a particular doctrine originated with Bhartrihari, and to base upon that assertion other chronological superstructure. So far as the evidence goes therefore it is not proved that Dandin lived after 650 A. D., the traditional date of Bhartrihari's death.

(iii) A कर्मिकर्म is कर्म in the sentence कर्म कर्मिकर्म. Here the causal activity consists in the manufacture of the कर्म, and its exact nature is determined by the object to be produced. A कर्मिकर्म is कर्म in the sentence कर्मिकर्म कर्म कर्मिकर्म. Here again the exact nature of the causal operation depends upon the sort of कर्म or कर्म effected. As distinct from these is the कर्मिकर्म, v.2. कर्म in the sentence कर्म कर्मिकर्म or कर्म कर्मिकर्म. Here the कर्म or कर्म involves the same kind of activity whether its object is कर्म or something else. Hence Dandin says that in कर्मिकर्म and कर्मिकर्म कर्म the कर्म is कर्मिकर्म. While in कर्म it is generally (सर्वत्र कर्मिकर्म कर्मिकर्म कर्मिकर्म कर्मिकर्म कर्मिकर्म) —says (C) but only. As a further consequence it follows that in the first two instances other कर्म are expressed by other कर्म and cannot be कर्मिकर्म, but they are unnecessary for the fact. It will be incidentally noted that कर्मिकर्म कर्म the कर्म is the leading out of the कर्मिकर्म to its object, its appearance is the कर्मिकर्म कर्मिकर्म theory of कर्मिकर्म कर्म.

Notes to II. 241-245—(i) In II. 242 the forests have been transformed into poison. A *vikār* involves a change of form and quality, the inner substance remaining the same.

(ii) Bhoja has given II. 243 as an illustration of what he calls प्रयोक्तुः विज्ञानवित्ते हेतुः । For explanation see *Sarasvatikanthābhāṣana*, p. 274 f.

(iii) Dandin has given for प्राप्यकर्म an illustration that depends upon our understanding the doctrine of इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्यकारिता. A straight-forward illustration would have used an ordinary verb of motion. This he has done in II. 244; only, mere statements like "birds are repairing unto their nests" have no poetry if interpreted wholly and solely as containing the statement of a प्राप्यकर्म. Bhāmaha criticises such bald or unpoetic statements in the following words (II. 87)—

गतोऽस्मद्वै भातीन्दुर्यान्ति वामाव पक्षिण ।

इत्येवमादि किं काव्यं कर्तामेतां प्रवक्ष्यते ॥

(iv) Here an interesting chronological question has been raised. Is Dandin by his words—इतीदमपि साधेर (II. 244^c)—expressing his dissent from Bhāmaha's unjust condemnation of the *śābya*, or is Bhāmaha criticising Dandin by refusing to allow as poetry what Dandin gives as good poetry. At first blush both views seem to be equally correct, but it seems to us that if one of the two writers is quoting the other at all, it is Bhāmaha who is criticising Dandin, though it is possible that the verse was one of the floating traditional lines—like many another in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*—which had been made the object of exposition by several *Ālankārikas* before them. Dandin, we think, gives it as his opinion that the line is unpoetic, and so is not an illustration of कारकहेतु with प्राप्यकर्म. But it can be a good कारकहेतु for indicating the time. Mammata thus brings out the suggestion about the कालावस्था (P. 290)—गतोऽस्मद्वै इत्यतः सपर्यं प्रत्यक्षरश्चन्द्रनावसर इति अभिवर्णनमुपकल्प्यतामिति प्राप्तप्रायसो प्रेयानिति कर्महेतुत्वमिव नोपदेह इति साध्यो विविद्वद्भूतमिति इति मा गा इति मुख्यो दृष्ट प्रवेशस्तमिति सन्नेधुना न

भवति विवेकपूर्णं गद्यं यस्यामिति नागनेत्यादि अत्रानेनानि विवेकपूर्णं
मन्त्रं तत्र प्रतिभाति ।

(v) Dandin uses the words *इतिवन्ति* शब्देन to explain why he has not taken a regular verb implying motion as his illustration for *प्रत्ययम्*. A mere motion as that of birds to their nests has no *विषय* if understood as an illustration of a *कामकहेतु* with *प्रत्ययम्*. But, says he, the instance can be a good illustration for a *प्रापकहेतु*. After this Dandin proceeds to give a regular example of a *प्रापकहेतु* in IL 245. Similarly Bhāmaha can be understood as criticising the line in question even as the illustration of a *प्रापकहेतु*. It then becomes mere *वर्ण*, mere report of the weather, and hence void of any *alamkāra*. The chronological relation between Dandin and Bhāmaha cannot in any case be made to rest upon the doubtful testimony of this passage alone

Notes to IL 246-252—(1) Bhoja quotes from Dandin stanzas IL 247, 248, 249, 250 and 251. His comments on these are—
IL 247—अत्र विद्यान-व्यासादः प्रागभावस्य व्यसनादिकारणत्वम् । IL 248—अत्र कामकभोगादगमनादेः प्रकृतभावस्य पुण्याधमानुसमानकारणत्वम् (with the variant गतां for अना) IL 249—अत्र वनानि अश्वनि न दृष्टान्तिवदेति नरनराभावस्य मनःप्रमोदकारणत्वम् । IL 250—अत्रानालोचनवेष्टितम्यालान्तमने विभूतीनां निविनमद्विद्वत् । (with the variants नेषु for तेषां and निविनं बन्धा विभूत्य for मनस सर्वगपद) IL 251—अत्र वस्तुन उवाचः प्रत्ययभावो व्यर्थः । नेनैव सप्तकम्भरणामृष्टेदम्य दाविकनारीणां मरणे कारणत्वम् । For a more accurate explanation of the last illustration see our Sanskrit commentary IL 251'. The commentary also gives the other three illustrations not given by Dandin

Notes to IL 253-254—(1) A *विग्रहः* is a violation of the law of Nature. Hence Dandin suggests that the violation should not be prominently expressed but should be conveyed in a secondary or subdued tone. Otherwise it would be a different figure of speech

Notes to II. 255—(i) The example given involves only व्यलङ्घनदृष्टा; Bhoja gives also an example of बालङ्घनदृष्टा in the verse अनध्वनेन etc. quoted by us in our Sanskrit commentary to II. 255

(ii) Several writers who do not recognise Hetu as a distinct alamkāra designate the व्यलङ्घनविशेष between कारण and कार्य as a distinct figure-of-speech known as असंगति. Mammata thus defines it (p. 869)—

भिवदेततत्त्वान्न कार्यकारणभूतयोः ।

युगपदसंयोगेन स्यादिति सा स्यादसंगतिः ॥

explaining the point thus in his Vṛtti—इह दर्शयते कार्यकारणभूतयोः स्यादिति । यत्र तु देवपुत्रस्य भवति भवति चेन्न स्यादिति तदा तदादेतत्तत्त्वान्न युगपदसंयोगेन सा स्यादिति स्यादसंगतिः ।

Notes to II. 256—(i) A more interesting example of the variety is—

(ii) A figure-of-speech called विहित and defined in the *वृत्त्यमन्द* (131) as—विहितं परस्मान्तज्ञानः सादृशवेष्टितम् । is very difficult to distinguish from मूल्य. The *अद्विष्टाकार* thus defines the distinction (ibid, p 191)—सूत्रमार्तसरे परा-
 13) defines it Rudrata on the other hand defines it as (12).

यथातिप्रबलतया गुण. समानाधिकरणसममानम् ।
 अर्थात्तर्हि विद्वद्भादाविर्भूतमपि तत् विहितम् ॥

Notes to II. 265-267—(i) In मूल्य there is the discovery of the hidden thing, but not disclosure. In वेष्ट (No 1) there is (a) a concealing, (b) a discovery leading to imminent disclosure, and (c) an attempt to prevent the disclosure under some other pretext. This figure is known in other writers as व्याजोक्ति defined by Rudrata (p 174) as—उद्भिप्रवस्तुनिगूहनम् and by Visvanatha (x 92) as—व्याजोक्तिर्ज्ञेयं व्याजोक्तुर्निगूह्यमपि वस्तुन । Vāmana's definition (iv 3. 25)—व्याजस्य सन्त्यगाख्यं व्याजोक्तिः is tantamount to the same thing.

(ii) This figure has to be distinguished from अपहृति (II 304). As will be clear from Dandin's definition of the latter figure (cp also Note (iii) to ii 95) he does not regard मूल्य as the invariable basis of an अपहृति, and so the usual distinction between these two figures cannot be stated as it is generally stated by commentators—साम्यमूलकताहवोपहृति । अथ (i e व्याजोक्ति or वेष्टे) तु न साम्यविवेकिते भेदः । We can perhaps formulate the distinction between them by saying that in an अपहृति neither the thing negated nor the thing asserted is anything like subtle or mysterious. In वेष्ट the subtlety of the thing constitutes the very essence of the figure.

(iii) Vāmana's example for the figure is—

साम्यमूलकताहवोपहृति (v. l. चतुर्धाहवोपहृति) अथ (i e व्याजोक्ति or वेष्टे) तु न साम्यविवेकिते भेदः । We can perhaps formulate the distinction between them by saying that in an अपहृति neither the thing negated nor the thing asserted is anything like subtle or mysterious. In वेष्ट the subtlety of the thing constitutes the very essence of the figure.

Notes to II. 275—(i) Dandin now defines together a group of three *Ālamkāras* known as रमालंकारः. Bhāmaha (iii. 1-7) and Udbhata (p. 49, generally following Bhāmaha in his treatment) are alone amongst ancient writers to recognise these three *ālamkāras* in the sense in which Dandin understands them. Ruyyaka (P. 185), Viśvanātha (x. 95-96) and one or two later writers accept these *ālamkāras* and even add to their number the *ālamkāras* designated as Samāhita, Bhāvodaya, Bhāvasamdhī, and Bhāvasabalāṭha (see Kuvalayanandachandrikā on stanzas 169f), but they have radically altered the nature of these figures in as much as they require that in these figures the रस, भाव, etc ought to be introduced in subordination to another वाक्यार्थ and not prominently and for their own sake. This view was first propounded by the author of the ध्वनिकारिका (cp II. 5, p. 71)—

प्रधानेन्यत्र वाक्यार्थे यत्राह तु रसादयः ।

काव्ये तस्मिन्नलंकारी रमादिरिति मे मतिः ॥

Anandavardhana's *Āloka* on this *kārikā* runs as follows —यत्रापि रसवदलंकारस्यान्यैर्दर्शितो विषयस्तदापि यस्मिन् काव्ये प्रधानतवान्योद्यो वाक्यार्थोभूतस्तस्य चाहभूता ये रसादयस्तो रसादेशलंकारव्यविषय इति सामग्रीन पक्षः । Dandin, Bhāmaha, or some predecessor of them is perhaps intended to be alluded to in the *kārikā* in question: Abhinavagupta in his ध्वन्यालोकलाघन to the passage actually mentions Bhāmaha. Our Sanskrit Commentary on II. 275 lines 123ff. quotes Premachandra's attempt to defend the position taken by Dandin and Bhāmaha as against the new school.

(ii) We have explained in a general way in our Note (i) to § 18 the nature of *Rasa*, but it is necessary to afford a detailed exposition of the theory of *Rasas* in all its bearings. Poetry consists of two elements—words and sense (ignoring the question of their relative prominence). Now there are excellences and defects belonging to words and to sense, and these are treated at great length in the works of the earlier *Ālamkārikas*. They were considered as character-

letics inherent in the "body" of poetry. Dapdin calls them *gunas* or life-breaths (I. 42). And as a body can have extraneous ornaments to set forth its natural charm so poetry also had its "ornaments" or *alamkāras*, these being specific turns of expression or thought which could not be covered by the usual *gunas* (and *śāstras*). For a time advance in the science of Poetics consisted mainly in an elaboration of the *gunas* and *alamkāras*, their number and mutual distinction. The next step of importance taken was the formulation of the doctrine of *śīlis* or styles. It was probably discovered that certain schools, courts, or literary coteries developed only specific *gunas* and *alamkāras* to the exclusion of others; and as these originally were confined to definite territorial divisions the styles cultivated by them got the nicknames of *vēdāśīlī*, *śīlī*, *paśāśīlī*, etc. This may have led to emulation which in time degenerated into jealousy and animosity, and the ultimate compromise effected only ended in the doctrine that all the *śīlis* had each an element of good and of evil in it.

(III) All this time however no attempt was made to explain why certain *gunas* or *alamkāras* afford pleasure more than others. A mere external labelling and classification was naturally felt to be inadequate in a science of Aesthetics. Help was sought at first from the sister science of Dramaturgy. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* had led down the Sūtra—*विभक्त्यनुसृत्य विभक्तिरित्येवमिति* (Adhyāya vi, p. 62, where this ancient theory is quoted and explained). The generating and intensifying factors (*anuvāda* and *śūnya* *viśāda*) are *śīla*, *śūnya*, etc. and *anuvāda*, *śūnya* *viśāda*, etc. And they produce in the first place one or more of the *śīlis* *anuvādas*, which are somewhat involuntary and physiological in origin, and along with them a number of psychological moods or feelings through which the hero passes. These latter are some of them dominant feelings or *anuvādas* of which there are five enumerated, and some, concurrent feelings or *anuvādas*.

which no less than 33 are enumerated. The अनुभावः, स्वाधिभावः and व्यभिचारिभावः together make up the 49 (50) kinds of भावः, and these भावः, belonging to राम, दुःखन, etc. (or to the actors representing them), called into existence by definite "factors," produce in the audience by sympathy the nine रसः or sentiments. This is the theory of the Nāṭyaśāstra which can be graphically thus presented:—

आलम्बन उद्दीपन	{ विभावः produce (in Actor)	[8 सात्विक अनुभावः 8 (9) स्वाधिभावः 33 व्यभिचारिभावः]	{ produce 8 (9) रसः (in Audience)

The eight अनुभावः are enumerated in our Sanskrit Com ii. 275⁷⁵⁻⁷⁶, the स्वाधिभावः in ii. 275⁷⁷⁻⁷⁹, and व्यभिचारिभावः in ii. 275⁸⁰⁻⁸². The eight (or nine) रसः correspond to the nine स्वाधिभावः—

रति to मृदुता	क्रोध to रोद	जुगुप्सा to बांभल
हास to हास्य	उन्माद to वीर	विस्मय to अद्भुत
शोक to वरुण	भय to भयानक	[निर्वेद to शान्त]

(iv) Dandin is aware of the existence of the रस theory (cp i. 51, ii. 280, iii. 170, and especially the last passage) but he did not know how to organically incorporate it with his theory of Poetics. Accordingly he merely gives a recognition to the रस theory by introducing a new variety of अलङ्कारः for cases where the रसः for their own sake were pre-eminently developed in a poem which was otherwise devoid of the usual गुणः or मन्त्रः. The रस comes in for recognition also in connection with Dandin's treatment of मन्त्रः (L. 51). This was merely borrowing a feather from the sister science. Rāsa is of the nature of an inner consciousness (hence called अन्तरा), and it is evident that it can be felt even in poems not containing the रसः अलङ्कारः. Some Alankārikas, as we saw, tried to get out of the problem by recognising रसः अलङ्कारः only in those cases where the रसः is felt as being subordinated to the रसः proper.

(v) The real solution of the matter came from the grammarians. If poetry consists of words having specific sense (or words and actions), it is necessary to

determine at first the varieties of sense or *artha*. There is the expressed sense or the *वाच्यार्थ* and the figurative or indicative sense or *लक्ष्यार्थ*. In the stock instance *गङ्गा* means literally and primarily the stream, which is the *वाच्यार्थ*. But in statements like *गङ्गायां प्रमः* the word must mean not the stream but the bank. This is the secondary significance of the word or its *लक्ष्यार्थ*. Now why should a person be prompted to say *गङ्गायां प्रमः* instead of *गङ्गानटे प्रमः*? Clearly there must be a *प्रयोजन* (ignoring for the moment the few cases where *वृत्ति* overpowers it), and this was discovered to be the intention to bring out the *दीप्य*, *पादत्व*, and other qualities inherent in the *प्रम* by reason of its proximity to the stream. The *प्रयोजन* of a *लक्षणा* is therefore the *व्यङ्ग्य* sense. In cases like the above where the *वाच्य* and the *लक्ष्य* senses can be clearly distinguished from the *व्यङ्ग्य* sense there is no difficulty of any kind. But there are cases where the *व्यङ्ग्य* is *अव्यक्तव्यक्त*; where the statement as a whole brings in a subtle suggestion without our being able to locate it as resulting from some specific word or words, and all *rasa* could now come in under the *अव्यक्तव्यक्तव्यङ्ग्य*.

(vi) One inevitable consequence of the share which the grammarians had in the formulation of the *ध्वनि* theory was the adoption of their *रस* theory by the *Alankārikas*. Anandavardhana in his *रस शिरोमणि* (p. 47-48) clearly recognises this indebtedness. He says—*प्रथमे हि विदुषो वैयाकरण आचरणमुक्त्या गदविज्ञानम् । ते च श्रुतमात्रेषु वचेषु ध्वनिमिति व्यवहृतिः । त्वेवाव्यक्तव्यक्तव्यङ्ग्यमिति सूत्रेण वाच्यत्वव्यङ्ग्यत्वमिति व्यङ्ग्यत्वव्यङ्ग्यत्वमिति सूत्रेण ।* In other words

वैया = call *रस* = *ध्वनि*, as being the *व्यङ्ग्य* of *वाच्य* (to which *गङ्गायां* sounds are subordinate),

वाच्य = call *रस* = *ध्वनि*, as being the *व्यङ्ग्य* of *व्यङ्ग्य* (to which the *वाच्य* sense is subordinate).

This means that there is no *रस* but only an *अव्यक्तव्यक्त* of the *rasa*. That is to say, the gestures and movements of the actor can prevail over you only if you are moved and have once experienced feelings and emotions.

country by the Chālukya monarch, Pulakeśin II, about 609 or 610. Pulakeśin was victorious at first, but was later defeated by Narasimhavarman I in 642. A. D. Mahendravarman is reported to have been a Jain originally, and to have been converted to faith in Śiva by a famous Tamil saint. If therefore we can imagine that राजवर्मन् is a poetic variant for महेंद्रवर्मन् or the महेंद्रवर्मन् bore रतवर्मन् as an additional name, we have here all the evidence that we can expect from tradition for placing Dandin at the court of the Pallavas of Kāñchi in the first half of the 7th century. And as the Pallava power was at its height during this very period, their kingdom might have at this time included the old Chera or Kerala country. We may add that the king Vishnuvardhana mentioned in the earlier part of the extract can be the prince Vishnuvardhana who founded, about A. D. 615, the line of the Eastern Chālukyas. Ānandapura the city I am unable to identify.

(iv) The eight forms of manifestation mentioned in II. 278 are of course the same as the अष्टविधा सृजोऽष्टप्रति alluded to by Kālidāsa in the benedictory verse of the Śākuntala.

Notes to II. 280-281—(i) Dandin is now going to give in succession the illustrations for सृज, a separate one for each.

(ii) Our Ms. N. in a different hand, gives the marginal note identifying सृज with सृज. Vāsavadatta was an Avanti Prince; compare Svapnavāsavadatta V. 5. An interesting question is to determine whether Dandin is referring to Bhīṣa. Definite indications are unfortunately lacking. The pretended burning of Vāsavadatta at Lavastaka is an old story not invented by Bhīṣa. Many dramatists besides Bhīṣa have worked on the theme. *Śvapnavāsatī* is a play later than *Ratnavallī* (see the account given by Hultsch in Nach K. G. W. Göt., 1880). Abhinavagupta in his *Nāṭyaśāstra* (Mādhava Ms., vol. III, p. 44) speaks of a play

of Subandhu dealing with the story of उदयन and कामवदना. His exact words are—तत्रस्य बहुतरस्यापिनो बहुगर्भेराप्राथितुम्यस्य नात्र विनये दाहने मदात्रविमुक्तपुनिवदो कामवदनात्तरासाह्वः (?) समस्य तत्र प्रयोगः । तत्र हि विन्दुस्वरः प्रयोज्यस्तुत उदयनचरिते मामाजिगीहृतेषु उदयनो वागवदनाकेने.....तत्र उदयने मामाजिगीहृते मूलशरप्रयोग —तत्र मुचोरेतेव अचरीतः । तत्र उदयन—पुनो सम मुचरितानीनि मार्गे विव्यनि । From this it appears that this particular play made use of a play-within-the-play in the *dénouement*. There is also a newly discovered play called *Vināvāsavadatta* (?) affording analogy in construction with the *Bhāsa* plays. Besides there are the *Śāṅkayānīya* dealing with the story of *Vāsavadattā* which were probably known even to the author of *Vyākaranamahābhāṣya* (see Kielhorn's ed., vol II, p. 284), which however could not have contained a verse like the one given by Dandin. Seeing that *Bhāsa's* *Svapnavāsavadattā* does not contain the present verse, it is perhaps possible that Dandin is here alluding to the unknown play of Subandhu referred to by Abhinavagupta, or to some other unknown work.

(iii) In the variants to II 280 read—"R, B, गिरा हन्वी P, Rn; " instead of 'P, R, B; ".

(iv) The following quotation from Abhinavagupta's *Nāṭyavedavivṛiti* (Madras ms p 204) is worth noting—विनिवृत्तां आयमेव परा । तर्थाद दृष्टेना ह्यस्य(स्या ?) प्रत्ययान्तो-दधादि-रति-प्रत्ययान्तं स्यात्प्रत्ययान्तोऽयमेवेति । ओ मय परा कोटि कोटि मद्राव्यतां शत द्वादि च ।

Notes to II. 282-285—(i) The stanza is 282, and II 284 are apparently of Dandin's own composition, and the same explanation might have been available in the case of II. 280 also.

Notes to II. 286—(i) The stanza is undoubtedly reminiscent of *Rādhavanā* III 57—

नराः सन्निवृत्ते मृ, द्वादि च दृष्टेना ह्यस्य
रतिः (रतिः) च स्यात्प्रत्ययान्तोऽयमेवेति

Udbhata (p. 51) adds the extra line—

वाच्यवाचकवृत्तिर्वा शब्देनावगमात्मना ॥

Rudrata (vii. 42)

यस्तु विवक्षितवस्तुप्रतिपादनराक्षनमदनी तस्य ।
यदजनकमज्जनं वा तत्कथनं यत् स पर्यायः ॥

Bhoja (iv. 80)—

मित्रे यदुक्तिभट्टिर्यावमरो यः स मूर्तिभिः ।
निराकाङ्क्षोऽथ साकाङ्क्षः पर्याय इति मीयते ॥

Ruyyaka (p. lii)—

गम्यस्यापि भट्टयन्तरेणाभिधानं पर्यायोक्तम् ।

Mammata (Ullāsa x. p. 828)—

पर्यायोक्तं निना वाच्यवाचकत्वेन यद्वचः ।

Vāgbhata (iv. 108)—

अन्तरतया यत्र कथ्यमानेन वस्तुना ।
विवक्षितं प्रतीयेत पर्यायोक्तिरित्यं तथा ॥

Vāgbhata (p. 36)—

ध्वनिनाभिधानं पर्यायोक्तिः ।

Hemachandra (p. 263)—

व्यङ्ग्यव्योक्तिः पर्यायोक्तम् ।

Pratāparudriya (p. 446)—

कारणं गम्यते यत्र प्रस्तुतात् कार्यवर्णनात् ।
प्रस्तुतत्वेन संबद्धं तत्र पर्यायोक्तमुच्यते ॥

Ekāvali (viii. 29)—

यत्र व्यङ्ग्यवचनो हेतोः कार्यवर्णनमङ्गीकृतं ।
व्याख्यातं तन्मुपि च पर्यायोक्तं विदुः ॥ २९ ॥

Sāhityasampradāya (x. 41)

पर्यायवचनं यदा भट्टयः व्यङ्ग्यवचनं 'व्यङ्ग्यवचनं' ।

Kuvalayaśāstrī (17)

पर्यायोक्तं तु गम्यमानं वचनं व्यङ्ग्यवचनम् ।

and Jaganathā (p. 409)—

(४२) 'वचनव्यङ्ग्यवचनं व्यङ्ग्यवचनम्' ।

Ruyyaka (p 183-184)—

मनुस्मिन्मनुष्यार्थममुदात्तम् । अद्वैतमहापुराणनिर्दिष्टम् ।

Mammata (x. p 831 ff.)—

उदात्तं वाच्यं मनुस्मृत्या चोपलक्षणम् ।

Vicranātha (x. 94 f.)—

लंकाविजयमन्त्रिणोदात्तमुच्यते ।

यदापि प्रमुखायां मन्त्रिणां भक्तिर्भवेत् ॥

(ii) Some writers refuse to recognise the figure. Thus Hemachandra observes (p 293)—उदात्तं तु ऋद्धिमद्वृत्तलक्षणमनिदायोक्त्येवमेतत् न भिद्यते । महापुराणवर्णनात् न च यदि एतत् तदा चर्त्तयेत् । It will be noted—and Udbhata lays it down as a distinct condition—that the महापुराणवर्तिन must be introduced only subordinatedly. As Pratihārendurāja observes (p 54)—न मन्त्रप्र महापुराणवर्तिनः । काव्यभाष्येण च महापुराणवर्तिनः । अर्थान्निवेशलक्षणमनुदात्तम् । यत्र च समासप्रयोगावस्थाने तत्र तेषां काव्यविशेषानिधानेन च पुराणनादत्तप्राप्यमर्थसम्बन्धिकायां तेषां मन्त्रप्रोदात्तमनुदात्तमवस्थानम् । This disposes of the second objection of Hemachandra and serves to distinguish उदात्त from एतत् ।

(iii) The उदात्त which is अनुदात्तवर्तिनः is not more एतत् किं cp Note (iii) to II 9 11. The Alamkārasarvasva also distinguishes उदात्त from भक्ति (भक्तिगतवर्तिनः प्रोक्त एतत्) but this last is understood by Dandin in quite a distinct sense (cp II 104 ff.). The words of Ruyyaka are these (p 183 f.)—उदात्तं वाच्यं च ऋद्धिमद्वृत्तलक्षणम् । लंकाविजयमन्त्रिणोदात्तमुच्यते । यदापि प्रमुखायां मन्त्रिणां भक्तिर्भवेत् ।

Notes to II 304 (i) A few textual details of Agastya's are given below.

Agastya (x. p. 183) says that in

Rāmāyaṇa (ii. 10) and Udbhata (p. 183)

मनुस्मृत्या चोपलक्षणम् ।

उदात्तं वाच्यं मनुस्मृत्या चोपलक्षणम् ।

Rudrata (viii 57)—

अतिमाभ्यादुपमेयं यस्याममदेव कथ्यते सद्यपि ।
उपमानमेव सदिति च विज्ञेयापह्नुतिः मेयम् ॥

Vāmana (iv 35)—

गमेन वस्तुनान्यापलापोपह्नुतिः ।

Bhoja (iv 41)—

अपह्नुतिरपह्नुत्य किञ्चिदभ्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
औपम्यवत्यनौपम्या चेति सा द्विविधाप्यते ॥

Ruyyaka (p. 50)—

विषयस्यापह्ववेपह्नुतिः ।

Mammata (x, p. 735)—

प्रकृत यन्निषिध्यान्यत माथ्यते सात्वपह्नुतिः ।

Vāgbhata (p. 39)—

प्रकृतस्य मन्त्रेणापलापोपह्नुतिः ।

Vagbhata (iv 86)—

नेतदेनदिह धर्मादिः उपह्ववपूर्वकम् ।
उच्यते यत्र साऽऽशङ्क्यपह्नुतिरित्येव यथा ॥

Kesavamisra (p. 34)—

किञ्चिदपह्नुत्य यदभ्यार्थेऽदृष्टान् मापह्नुतिः ।

Hemachandra (p. 281)—

प्रकृताप्रकृतान्या प्रकृतापलापोपह्नुतिः ।

Vidyadhara (p. 380)—

निषिधेय विषय साभ्यादभ्यासात् अपह्नुतिः ।

Vishvanatha (x 38f)—

प्रकृत प्रानाथ धान्यस्थ पत्र म्यादिपह्नुतिः ।
नापिनाथ स्मृताः च प्राप्तायत्ताः च येषन ॥
यादौ न्येय नयः सान्यययन मापह्नुतिः ।

Jagadnatha (p. 278)—

इत्येव एवमन्त्रेऽस्ति । एवमानाः । इत्येनामेव समापमुपमानतादात्म्य-
मसदिति ।

Vivekananda (p. 233)—

इति । निषेधेय निषेधान्तात् । सोऽपि सपह्नुतिः । इति ।

and Achutarya (viii 131)—

इति । इत्येव । इत्येव । इत्येव । इत्येव ।
आरेपमाणाः इति । इत्येव । इत्येव । इत्येव ।

in relation and *सुनिविष्टाप्रदेशन*, we are required to make an express mention of the two objects compared.

(vi) Though the illustration of a *शेय* (II. 310ff) might offer points of comparison with *सुष्ययोगिता*, the figure *शेय* always turns upon an unmistakable peculiarity which is its sufficient distinctiveness. The *patonoma* in II. 332^a is not intended or indispensable.

(vii) *Aprastutapratama* as Dandin conceives it involves *सुनि*, if not *सुनि* or *निन्दा*, but there is an absence of *अभिप्रेत* relation, and an implication of *प्रस्तुत* through *प्रस्तुत* statement, in place of the direct statement of the two found in a *सुष्ययोगिता*.

(viii) *Vyāṣṭuti* (II. 343) involves *सुनि* (or *निन्दा*) but it is feigned. And it is a *सुनि* made of a certain thing which might not be joined with any thing else in simile. A *सुष्ययोगिता* is necessarily based upon a relation between at least two things.

(ix) In *निदर्शन* the *साम्य* between the two things is not a well-established fact so that we could know before hand which is *गुणोत्कृष्ट* or *गुणनिम्न*. The *साम्य* is evolved just in the very act presented to our eyes.

Notes to II. 333-339.—(i) All writers except Bharata admit *विशेष* as a distinct figure. A few leading definitions are given below:—

Agnipurāṇa (344. 28)—

संगतीकृतौ युक्त्या सदसंगच्छप्रमाणयोः ।
विशेषपूर्वकत्वेन तद्विशेष इति स्मृतम् ॥

Bhāmaha (III. 24) and *Udbhaṭa* (p. 59)—

गुणस्य वा क्रियाया वा विरुद्धान्यविध्याभिरा [v.] वचः ।
वा [v.] वचः विशेषतः निधानाय विशेषे न विदुर्मुखा [v.] प्रवसते ॥

Rudrata (ix. 30)—

यस्मिन् दृष्ट्यादीनां परस्परं तद्वधा विरुद्धानाम् ।
एकत्रासक्त्याने समकालं भवन्ति न विशेषः ॥

Vaṃana (IV. III. 12) and *Ruyyaka* (p. 121)—

विरुद्धाभासत्वं विशेषः ।



(ii) It will be seen that while to later writers—

अप्रस्तुतवर्तनेन प्रस्तुतवर्तनप्रतीतिः ।५ अप्रस्तुतप्रतीतिः ;

to Dandin—

अप्रस्तुतप्रतीतिर्न प्रस्तुतवर्तनप्रतीतिः ।५ अप्रस्तुतप्रतीतिः ।

This has saved Dandin from the necessity (i) of distinguishing this figure from समाधोषि, अर्पान्तराद्य, श्लेष, etc.; and (ii) of explaining the circumstances which make it possible for the अप्रस्तुत to suggest प्रस्तुत. These circumstances give the several varieties of the figure as admitted by subsequent writers. In order to show how very complicated the whole business of classification has become at the hands of these later writers we give below a tabular statement based on the Kāvya-prakāśa—

अप्रस्तुतप्रतीतिः	(i) कार्ये प्रस्तुते कारणविधानम्
	(ii) कारणे प्रस्तुते कार्यविधानम्
	(iii) सामान्ये प्रस्तुते विशेषविधानम्
	(iv) विशेषे प्रस्तुते सामान्यविधानम्
	(v) मुख्ये प्रस्तुते दुर्गन्धविधानम्

Variety (v) further divided into

A. Use of श्लेष words for (विनयन + विशेष्य)	B Through व्यवहारोप as in समामोषि (with विनयन alone श्लेष)	C. Through simple श्लेष

Or again, independently, into

A. अनवधारोपेन	B. अवधारोपेन	C. अवधारोपेन
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(iii) Bhoja gives for अप्रस्तुतप्रतीति the twofold classification into शब्दा and प्रत्येकशब्दा, his instance for the latter being Dandin's illustration in II. 341 paraphrased ; viz.—

कार्यं वनेषु हरिणस्तुलानि वादन्यदन्त्यमुत्तमम् ।

विदधति धनिषु न देव्यं मे किञ्च पलाशं वरं मर्यादम् ॥

(ii) It will be seen that while to later writers—

अप्रस्तुतवर्णनेन प्रस्तुतवर्णनप्रतीतिः is अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा ;

to Dandin—

अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसनेन प्रस्तुतनिन्दाप्रतीतिः is अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा.

This has saved Dandin from the necessity (i) of distinguishing this figure from समाशोक्ति, अर्थान्तरन्दास, श्लेष, etc.; and (ii) of explaining the circumstances which make it possible for the अप्रस्तुत to suggest प्रस्तुत. These circumstances give the several varieties of the figure as admitted by subsequent writers. In order to show how very complicated the whole business of classification has become at the hands of these later writers we give below a tabular statement based on the Kāvya-prakāśa—

अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा	(i) कार्ये प्रस्तुते कारणमिधानम्
	(ii) कारणे प्रस्तुते कार्यमिधानम्
	(iii) सामान्ये प्रस्तुते विशेषमिधानम्
	(iv) विशेषे प्रस्तुते सामान्यमिधानम्
	(v) तुल्ये प्रस्तुते तुल्यान्तरमिधानम्

Variety (v) further divided into

A Use of शिष्ट words for विशेषण + विशेष्य	B Through व्यवहारोपेक्षा as in समाशोक्ति (with विशेषण alone शिष्ट)	C Through simple भास्य
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Or again, independently, into

A. अनुपपत्त्योपेक्षा	B. अन्वयोपेक्षा	C. अश्लेषोपेक्षा
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(iii) Bhoja gives for अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा the twofold classification into वाक्या and प्रत्येकवाक्या, his instance for the latter being Dandin's illustration in II. 341 paraphrased : viz.—

कार्ये वनेषु हरिणस्तृणानि शादन्त्यदन्त्यमुत्तममि ।
विश्वेति धनितु न देव्यं मे किं पश्ये क्वं मयिद-

(ii) It will be noted that all writers except Dandin, Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, and Vāmana consider both निन्दा स्तुतिः and स्तुत्या निन्दा as the legitimate spheres of this figure. It is not certain therefore whether Dandin really would permit the उपलक्षण which we have put upon the definition in our Sanskrit Commentary II. 343'. Rudraṭa gives the figure as a variety of श्लेषयुक्त figures, and so requires that it be based necessarily upon paronomasia. Bhoja, finally, makes no distinction between व्याजस्तुति and स्तुति defined as in Kāvya-darśa II. 268.

(iii) According to Dandin's view it seems that Leda No 2 is distinguished by the presence of a subtle element in the praise or blame, while in a व्याजस्तुति no such subtle element is necessary. This is the only distinction between these two figures. Hence we must either suppose that Dandin did not intend to accept Leda No 2 without reserve, or that Bhoja is justified in making स्तुति-व्याजस्तुति.

(iv) In an अग्रस्तुतप्रयोग there are two things: a प्रस्तुत and an अग्रस्तुत. Further the स्तुति of the अग्रस्तुत is real and not intended to be withdrawn. So also the निन्दा of the अग्रस्तुत. The स्तुति and निन्दा, it is also to be noted, is of two distinct things. It is not a case that the same thing is outwardly censured but really praised (and vice versa), as in a व्याजस्तुति.

(v) Similarly, while in व्याजस्तुति the apparent निन्दा is to be ultimately set aside, and श्रुति obtained by implication, the case is not one of simple अग्नि, in as much as the वाक्य is here entirely thrown overboard—a thing which does not necessarily happen in an ordinary अग्नि. Cp. on the point Jagannātha (p. 416)—अत एव नास्या अग्निमितम् । अतो हि वाक्येनाग्नौलभ्यमिदं नार्थांतरमवगम्यते । न चेवं प्रकृते ।

(vi) Bhoja quotes both the examples given by Dandin and remarks (p. 410)—व्याजस्तुतिर्गुणश्लेषोऽत्र वाक्यस्योपलक्षणं दृश्यम् ।

(vii) In II 345° वेदस्य is a better reading than वेदस्य, but we have no Ma. authority for adopting the improved reading.

Jagannātha (p. 339)—

उपसर्गोर्ध्वयोराभिर्दोषोपस्यपर्यवसायी निदर्शना ।

and Vīkveśvara (p. 262)—

उपसर्गपर्यवसायी यथाथोन्वोन्ममन्वयानर्हः ।

यच्च वियया कारणकार्यान्विद्यधीनिदर्शना सोऽसौ ॥

(ii) It will be observed that Dandin, Bhāmaha, Vāmana, and others admit what is known as the दोषन-निदर्शना as the only variety of the figure, while Mammata and most other writers admit an additional variety. Dandin's conception of this figure has the advantage of keeping true to the etymological sense of the figure

(iii) This दोषननिदर्शना is the same as the सम्बन्धसुनिदर्शना of Ruyyaka, Viśvanātha, and most later writers. As Appaya Dīkshita observes in his Chandrikā (p. 74)—
स्वार्थक्यदा परान् प्रति सदसदर्थबोधनं संगतदेव समतां गर्भकरोति । To the same effect also Jagannātha (p. 345). The second, and with later writers, the more usual variety is अवयवसुनिदर्शना divided into वाक्यार्थनिदर्शना and पदार्थनिदर्शना, a good example of the former being Mudrārākshasa (vii 6)—

केनोक्तुश्च शिष्याकृत्वापकपिलो बद्ध पटान्ने शिषी

पाशे केन सदागतेरगतिता सदा समापादिता ।

केनानेकपदजवामितगत मिहोर्षित. पञ्चे

भूमि केन च नेकनवमकरो दोर्भा प्रतीकोपेव ॥

The qualification which requires a सिद्ध्यन्तिविश्व relation between the two statements is to be noted. This relation has to be assumed in order to explain the prima facie impossibility of the relation between the two statements, which is dogmatically asserted. As Dandin does not recognise this अवयव variety, we need not enter in details into the exact scope of the figure as also its distinction from रसान्ता, which is another figure not recognised by our author. See on the point Alamkārasarvasva (p. 77)

(iv) Bhoja (p. 299ff.) introduces in Dandin's निदर्शने one or two minor principles of sub-division. The similarity is directly asserted in the statement or is left to be inferred. [The former is चयु the latter,

Vagbhaṭa (p. 33)—

सहभावश्चर्यं सहोक्तिः ।

Kesavamisra (p. 36)—

समानाद्योक्तिः सहोक्तिः । सा द्वयी—उदासीनयोस्त्वताप्रतिपक्षे कार्य-
कारणयोरपि ।

Hemachandra (p. 273)—

सहार्थबलाद्धर्मस्यान्वयः सहोक्तिः ।

Vidyānātha (p. 400)—

सहार्थान्वयो यत्र भवेदतिशयोक्तिः ।
कन्तिरपिभ्यपर्यन्ता सा सहोक्तिरितीष्यते ॥

Viśvanātha (x 55)—

सहार्थस्य बलादेकं यत्र व्यावृत्तकं द्वयोः ।
सा सहोक्तिर्यत्संभूतानि शयोक्तिर्यदा भवेत् ॥

and Jagannātha (p. 357)—

गुणप्रभं नभावावच्छिन्नप्रमहाद्यसंबन्धं सहोक्तिः ।

(iii) The statement of simultaneity between the qualities or actions of two objects, which constitutes the essence of this figure is not a matter-of-fact description as in युक्तं महात्मन पिता ॥ It is अतिशयोक्तिमुल्लेख Ruyvaka however goes further and says (p. 81)—एतन्न नियमेन निद्रायाश्चक्षुस्त्वयमया । सा [अतिशयोक्तिः] न क दकारणप्रतीत्यसमविवर्त्ययकपु न्यभेदात्प्रवृत्त्यायकपु न । अर्भेदं यदसामान्यं व्यावृत्तकं न्यया क । Ruyvaka thus recognises the figure as a variety of सहोक्ति based on क द कारणप्रतीत्यसमविवर्त्ययकपु न्यभेदपरमार्थे सत्यं सतीति वीर्यवत्त्वमसौ । Jagannātha refuses however to recognise it as variety. An Aśvaka-kāṣṭhubha (p. 331) observes—का दकारणप्रतीत्यसमविवर्त्ययकपु न्यभेदं यदसामान्यं व्यावृत्तकं न्यया क । दस्तु प्रवृत्त्यायकपु न युक्तं । एतन्न नान्यथाप्रतीत्यसमविवर्त्ययकपु न ।

एव कालावस्थितस्य कालेन युगलप्रभः ।

इत्यादिशयोक्त्यपेक्षया

न च कार्यरिनाशस्य सहोक्त्युपपत्तिरिति ।

हतिं सहोक्तिं [अतिशयोक्तिं] न्यायवत् । इत्येव ननु न । The relation between the two objects brought together in a सहोक्तिः should be merely गुणप्रधानाद्यप्युक्त्युत्पत्तिः ॥ (iii) एवमुक्तं महात्मनः । Jagannātha would not see the view of Jagannātha-

(ii) Two points deserve to be noted. The latter ought to be *refining* and *charming*. An actual commercial transaction however noteworthy cannot be an instance of this figure. Secondly, there ought to be a regular sales-agent in the transaction. Accordingly a case like—*ḥim qurqumam'a ḥim qū qurqum'a qurqum* or *ḥimqum'a qurqum* and *qum qurqum'a qurqum* where there is only a *qurqum* or *ḥim qurqum* (*ḥimqum'a qurqum*) cannot be a regular *qurqum* in the normal acceptance of the term *ḥimqum*. Mammals and Japanathas also are against admitting *qurqum*, while *qum* and *qurqum* admit it. Blase attempts to hold the balance evenly by regarding *qurqum* as a sub-variety of *Parvathi*. The example
 1 797 : 12

— 1 797 : 12 (1 797 : 12) (1 797 : 12)

(ii) At the same time it is necessary to point out that the 36 embellishments of speech involving specific emotional *modes* which are enumerated by Bharata at the beginning of the 16th Chapter of the Nāṭyaśāstra, and which occur also in Jayadeva's Chandrāloka, Mayūkha iii, include (along with such things as गुणकीर्तन, प्रोत्साहन, आकन्द, प्रतिषेध, परिदेवन, etc.) आशीः or benediction. Now it must be admitted that, in a given situation, benediction can become a very effective mode of expressing one's thoughts; and a dramatist has every right to collect all such effective modes of expression together. But why Dandin should have selected only one of them for inclusion amongst the regular अलङ्कारs cannot be determined. We may however point out in passing that some others out of the 36 have been universally regarded as forming the basis of some of the regular figures.

(ii) It is worth noting—as pointing to an independence of tradition and perhaps an absence of interdependence between Dandin and Bhāmaha—that Dandin takes आशी as a regular benediction. Bhāmaha gives two illustrations for the figure. In the first (see our Com ii 357¹¹) two friends, who have been estranged from one another by malicious and mendacious go-betweens, perceive their error, and one of them calls upon the other to join hands again. On this Hemachandra remarks—तत्र च तस्य चेतोऽग्निरिवोद्यते श्रेयसात् रतिमावदिवोदय आशीर्द्वारेण प्रतीयत इति भावार्थनिरेखायम् । ... । अत्र आशास्यमानस्य मैत्रीसंकल्पस्योपनिबन्धो न स्वप्राप्तप्राप्ताच्छात्मिका आदीत् । In the second example also (see our Com ii 357¹²⁻¹³), Hemachandra points out that the hostile cities have already been vanquished. Hence, तथाविधानां शत्रुनगरीणां दर्शनमथ प्राप्तकालया-
धनुश्रयणे । The illustration given by Dandin is of course अश्वत्थप्राप्ताच्छात्मिका आशीः । And the same is the case with Vāgbhaṭa.

Notes to II. 358-359^{ab}—(i) Before winding up his treatment of the regular *alankāras* and passing on to a consideration of the mixed *alankāras* (ii 360), Dandin

Notes to II. 361-362—(i) In the first half of ii. 361 there is an उपमा statement which can stand by itself. The उपमा is thus the principal figure. The धृतानुमलिनी considers the figure in the first half to be उत्प्रेक्षा; but आक्षिपति can be an उपमावाचकशब्द though not actually enumerated by Dandin. In the second half we have an अर्थान्तरन्यास based upon श्लेष. The particular statement about the invasion of the beauty of the face by lotuses is corroborated by the general fact that, given कोश and दण्ड, any body can invade. The awkwardness of the general statement containing a pronoun (एषा) referring to a noun in the particular statement can be got over by making एषाम्—एषा संक्रान्ताम्. Nor is the difficulty so very serious at all. We need not accordingly make the figure a हेतु instead of an अर्थान्तरन्यास, as suggested by some commentators.

(ii) Dandin has not apparently given an illustration for सर्वेषां समकक्षता. The stanza ii. 362 (op. ii. 225^{ab}) supplies the deficit. But it is omitted in most Mss. and Cb quotes the stanza with the remark—समकक्षतायां आयुदाहरणमन्यत्र दृश्यम्। It may be added in passing that Bhoja gives as his example for this kind of संसृष्टि (which he calls निलतण्डुलमंसृष्टि) the extra stanza पितृवैव तरङ्गाग्ने etc. mentioned in the variants to ii. 226 above. Even the धृतानुमलिनी does not notice ii. 362, and surely it would have been possible for Dandin, without repeating himself, to give another instance for समकक्षसंसृष्टि if he had thought it necessary. We should in this connection recall the fact that Dandin has not given illustrations for all the मध्यर्थापक or the अन्यर्थापक varieties. Compare our Commentary to ii. 104 ff.

Notes to II. 363 —(i) Of the three figures-of-speech contained in ii. 361 the relation between श्लेष and अर्थान्तरन्यास is perhaps much more immediate than that between अर्थान्तरन्यास and उपमा, but it would be incorrect to sug-

probably goes back to Kātyādarī IL 364^{ab}, where however भव apparently is used in a rather peculiar sense. We would there translate it by Sustained Intuition especially as Dandin makes it a प्रव्यविरयगुण. Bhāmaha also calls it (IL 52) a प्रव्यविरयगुण laying down for it the four-fold requirement, viz—

विशेदणमभुत्पर्यं कथायां स्वमिर्दता ।
सदमभुत्तलं येति तस्य हेतुं प्रवर्तते ॥

But Dandin's requirements for the figure as enumerated in II 365-366 seem to be peculiar to him, as also his whole conception of the same, wherein he is probably following a tradition distinct from that of Bhāmaha. Rhoja's conception of Bhāvika (which he identifies with उद्देश, IV. 85-86) is so very far removed from the two conceptions discussed hitherto that it need not be here taken into consideration at all.

(III) The Bhāvika of later writers is distinguishable from the गुण called प्रसाद, the रस named भद्रभुत, and अलंकार like स्वभावार्ति or भ्रान्तिमान or अतिशयोक्ति. Compare माहिल्यदर्शन (x p 574f)—न चायं प्रसादादयो गुण भवभावितो प्रप्रशयमाणत्वे तस्याहेतुत्वात् । न चादभुतो रस इत्यस्य प्रत्यस्य हेतुत्वात् । न चातिशयोक्तिरलंकारोऽप्यवयवाभावात् । न च भ्रान्तिमान भूतभावितो भूतभावित्वेव प्रसादान् । न च स्वभावार्ति तस्या स्तैविकवस्तुगतसूक्ष्मधर्मस्वभावस्यैव यथावदूर्णनं रूपमस्य तु वस्तुन प्रत्यशयमाणत्वस्यो त्रिभिर्दोषैर्विरोधीतीति । Hemachandra however refuses to admit this figure. He says (p 293)—भाविकं तु भूतभाविपदार्थप्रत्यक्षीकारात्मकमभिनेयप्रवर्त एव भवति । यद्यपि मुक्तकदो हृदये तथापि न तत् स्वदत्तं ।

(IV) Confining our attention to Dandin's own conception of भाविक it will be observed that Dandin's treatment of it is quite in place, coming as it does after his treatment of वस्तुक्ति, whereas, it is not quite clear why Bhāmaha should have called his भाविक a प्रव्यविरयगुण. Bhāvika is the quality belonging to a poem taken as a whole, and it suggests the formulation of questions like,—Is there a meaning to the whole? Is it consistently carried out? Is there a harmony and proportion of parts? Is it a clear and self-sufficient theme? These are questions of higher

